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RECOGNITION OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS AFTER THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AGREEMENT
BERNARD S. MEYERi"
CURRENT efforts toward "trade, not aid" have focused attention on the
welter of restrictions and controls which hamstring present day foreign trade.
Businessmen can enter into few international transactions without first ob-
taining an export license, an exchange permit, or an import license. In
the realization that increased international trade is the touchstone of world
economic stability, our Government has sought, through proposed amend-
ment of our laws and participation in various international agencies and
conferences, to minimize our own trade barriers and encourage other nations
to do the same. One of these international arrangements--the International
M11onetary Fund Agreement 1 -deals with obstacles posed by one form of
foreign trade restriction-the exchange control. While the Agreement's ulti-
mate aim is to eliminate the obstructive effects of such monetary restrictions,
it permits retention of certain kinds of controls-and it attempts to unify the
treatment these controls will receive in the courts of other nations. It is with
this attempt that this article is concerned.
M onetary controls can be traced back a number of centuries, but only dur-
ing the last thirty years have they reached full development. Originating as
direct measures intended to provide revenue or a limited protection of the
domestic economy, controls have grown as a result of upheavals of the Great
Depression and two World Wars into complex systems integrated with trade
restrictions for the purpose of allocating foreign exchange resources in ac-
cordance with governmental plan. Under most such systems, transactions
productive of foreign exchange are controlled in order to require that all or
some specified part of the exchange be surrendered to a central pool in return
for local currency at specified rates. Foreign exchange is then distributed
from the pool, through licensing or similar devices, to those persons who meet
the criteria of the particular governmental plan. Those unable to obtain the
required permission can deal only in "blocked" local currency accounts. In
Member, Maryland, District of Columbia, and Newv York Bars.
1. Published in UNITm NATIONS MoNErmny AND FINANciAL CoENm:.cn: FRnA.
AcT AxD R.ATED Docr..E.xaTs, PUBLICATION No. 2187, CONF. Sr. No. 55 (U.S. Dep't
State 1944). The International Monetary Fund Agreement is referred to hereinafter as
the "Fund Agreement" or simply as the "Agreement."
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order to prevent evasion, any importation or exportation of domestic currency
(except, perhaps, in specified small quantities) is prohibited. For some
favored categories of transactions, restrictions may be lifted through the use
of a "general license" or "free list." Without either a general or a specific
license, however, an exchange transaction falling within the restriction may
not be enforceable.
The effect of these controls is far-reaching. In the field of foreign sales
they result less in litigation than in a reduction of the volume of business done.
Traders, aware of the problem, simply refuse to do business except on the
basis of advance payment, or of letters of credit in their own currencies. The
litigation which arises results mainly from the migration of both persons and
capital which has taken place during the last two decades in the face of exist-
ing controls. A pensioner moving to a new country and finding his pension
cut off by controls will seek to reach funds of his ex-employer in the new
country. A political refugee, seeking safety for his funds or securities, may
deposit them abroad only to be met after escape with a refusal to turn them
over because required consents of his former homeland are lacking. The bank
or other stakeholder, on the other hand, is faced with a dilemma: it may ex-
pect suit by the government of the foreigner's domicile if it refuses to pay
over the funds to that government on demand, or, alternatively, suit by its cus-
tomer for conversion if it makes payment on such demand. A foreigner who
has inherited a bank account or other property located here may seek to effect
a transfer of it without the authorization required by his government. An
international traveler may seek by circuitous agreement to obtain the benefit
of higher but black-market rates of exchange, only to find that honor among
thieves is not always the rule. One who insures his life with a company of
his domicile may find, after emigration, that payment of the surrender value
of his policy cannot be made without a license. In these and many other
everyday situations exchange controls influence business decisions and the out-
come of litigation.
It is obvious that such broadly effective controls provide a trading position
which makes them an ideal instrument of economic nationalism and ultimately
of economic warfare. Hence, it is natural that the courts of the country im-
posing the restrictions should enforce them to the fullest possible extent, while
the courts of other countries should seek-either through application of con-
flict of laws rules or through the use of the "public policy" device-to cir-
cumvent them. Such was the economic and legal situation when, toward the
close of World War II, delegates of forty-four nations met at Bretton Woods
for the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference.
Out of that conference came agreement that "foreign exchange restrictions
which hamper the growth of world trade" 2 are undesirable in principle and
should be eliminated. At the same time, the economic reality of the post-war
situation was recognized and provision made for the maintenance or, if need
2. Art. I(iv).
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be, imposition of: (1) controls on "current" transactions during a transitional
period following establishment of the International Monetary Fund; (2) con-
trols when a Fund member's currency became scarce; (3) controls on capital
movements; and (4) controls directed toward non-member countries. While
repudiating restrictionism as a normal instrument of international economic
policy, the conferees, in order to protect the limited controls sanctioned by
the Agreement, found it necessary to reverse the legal doctrines under which
foreign controls had largely been circumvented by the courts. To this end,
they provided, in the first sentence of Article VIII, Section 2(b),3 that:
"Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and
which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that mem-
ber maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall
be unenforceable in the territories of any member."
The Fund Agreement became effective December 27, 1945, and was ac-
cepted by the United States in the Bretton Woods Agreements Act." Article
VIII, Section 2(b), has been officially interpreted by the Fund's Executive
Directors,5 and that interpretation has been re-issued in an official release of
the Chairman of the National Advisory Council on International and Financial
Problems.' Yet it was not until the cryptic decision handed downm by the New
York Court of Appeals in January, 1953, in Pcrut ',. Boienian Discount
Bank in Liquidation,7 that any court recognized that the Agreement had worked
a change in previously existing law. Up to that time, it had been construed
into insignificance by such an authority as Professor Arthur Nussbaum, who
concluded, "[O)ne may doubt whether Art. VIII, § 2(b), will assume any
major importance in legal practice,"89 and was generally ignored or circumvented
by the courts.9
In contrast to this history of neglect and restriction stands the change in
law intended to be brought by the Agreement. In order to ascertain
3. In the interest of brevity, reference is hereinafter made to art. VIII, §2(b), al-
though only the first sentence of that section may be in question.
4. 59 STAT. 512 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1946), hereinafter referred to as the "Act."
5. Dated June 14, 1949, and reported in IN-nTLRu A'rIOAL Mo:;.Eny Fc:.D, Ani.Ani.
REPoRT 1949, app. XIV (1949).
6. 14 FED. REG. 520S (1949). The release received press notice in the Journal of
Commerce, Aug. 24, 1949, p. 7, col. 4, and Business Week, Sept. 3, 1949, p. 92, col. 3.
7. 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953).
8. Nussbaum, Exchange Co strol md the International Monetary Fund, 59 Yx.n I.J.
421, 429-30 (1950); NUSSBAUM, MoRY IN Tr LAw, NATiu.AL A'm INTE:RATIONAL
545 (1950). See also Note, 79 JoUn.L Du DRoIT INNT~m~z-On, 710 (France 1952).
9. Cases in which the provision was ignored are discussed in Part IV infra. A 1943
Note analyzing exchange control law makes no reference to it, 34 V.. L Rm- 697; a
1951 Comment gives it only passing reference, Friedmann, Forcign Exchange Cotro!
in A2zwrican Courts, 26 ST. Joix's L. REv. 97.
For an example of a decision circumventing the provision, see CermaI: v. Bata
Akciova Spolecnost, 80 N.Y.S.2d 782, 785 (Sup. Ct 1948), aff'd sn:m., 275 App. Div.
919, 91 N.Y.S2d 835 (1st Dep't 1949).
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the status of exchange controls after the Agreement it is necessary to consider
the law governing exchange controls aside from the Agreement, to mention
the constitutional problems arising under our municipal law, and to analyze
the meaning and determine the effect of Article VIII, Section 2(b), by refer-
ence to the context in which it was adopted. With this analysis in mind, we
will then review the cases concerning member nations decided since that pro-
vision became effective and the cases outside the scope of the Agreement de-
cided during that period.
I. THE LAW ASIDE FROM THE FUND AGREEMENT
While an understanding of the law aside from the Fund Agreement pro-
vision is crucial, the large body of decisional and analytical writing already in
existence on that subject 10 makes permissible a statement of that law in nar-
rative form.
When the restriction in question is a law of the forum, it will be given
effect, 1 ' but the mere fact that a foreign law is involved will not warrant a
10. Treatises: DicEY, CONFLICr OF LAWs 750 et seq. (6th ed. 1949); DomxE, TRAD-
ING WITH THE ENEmY IN WORLD WAR II c. 20 (1943); MANN, THE LEGAL As'cwrs ov
MONEY 259 et seq. (1938); NussnAuls, MONEY IN THE LAW, NATIONAL AND INTER-
NATIONAL 446 et seq. (1950) ; WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 472 et seq. (1950),
Articles: Bloch & Rosenberg, Current Problens of Freezing Control, 11 FoRD. L. REv,
71 (1942); Cabot, Exchange Control and the Conflict of Laws: An, Unsolved Piawle, 99
U. OF PA. L. REv. 476 (1951); Cohn, Currency Restrictions and the Conflict of Laws, 52
L.Q. REv. 474 (1936) ; Domke, Foreign Exchange Restrictions (A Comparative Survey),
21 J. ComP. LEG. (3d Ser.) 54 (1939) ; Donke, Money in the Law, 24 J. ComP. LEO. (3d
Ser.) 51 (1942) (review of NusSBAt) ; Freutel, Exchange Control, Freeting Orders
and the Conflict of Laws, 56 HARv. L. R-v. 30 (1942) ; Friedmann, Foreign Exchange
Control in American Courts, 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 97 (1951); Nussbaum, Exchange
Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421 (1950); Nussbaum,
Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027 (1940) ;
Rashba, Foreign Exchange Restrictions and Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws, 41
MIcEa. L. REv. 777 and 1089 (1943) ; Weiden, Foreign Exchange Restrictions, 16 N.Y.U.
L.Q. Rzv. 559 (1939). Notes: 34 VA. L. Rzv. 697 (1948) ; 47 YALE L.J. 451 (1928). The
decisional writing is difficult to find because many of the appellate courts do not write
opinions and because of the unfortunate failure of the formulators of the Digest System
to include "Conflict of Laws" as a separate topic. Cases dealing with the instant prob-
lem are to be found dispersed under the following Key Numbers: Account Stated 14;
Assignments 31, 65; Banks & Banking 119, 188%, 192; Bonds 67; Contracts 101(1),
101(2), 103, 276; Corporations 468, 473(b), 473(g), 657(2); Courts 8, 9; Executors and
Administrators 84, 85(6), 207; Insurance 26, 244; International Law 4, 7, 10; Money
Lent 1; Mortgages 98; Property 6; Ship'ping 163; Trusts 362; and probably others.
Most of the decisions are by New York courts since it is in New York that attach-
able funds of the foreign defendant usually are found.
11. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 307 U.S. 265 (1939);
Boissevain v. Weil, [1949] 1 All E.R. 146 (C.A. 1948), aff'd, [1950] A.C. 327; Note, 34
VA. L. REv. 697 (1948).
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court of the forum refusing application of that law,'m if properly proved.13
Application or non-application of such a foreign law 14 will depend on many
and varying factors. While not often explicitly referred to, the time of im-
position of the regulation in relation to the transaction in question has a dis-
cernible bearing on its application.Yr The language in which the regulation
is cast and its interpretation in the state of origin may be vital since, if it is
regarded as a procedural rather than a substantive measure, the conflicts ex-
ception '0 will render it inapplicable. The relation of the property involved
to the original transaction is also important since a foreign restriction of the
state of situs of property originally involved will be applied,'7 whereas such
a restriction will be refused application if the property originally involved is
located in the forum.' On the other hand, the location of property from which
collection of the obligation was sought but which had no connection with the
original transaction has in some cases been seized upon as a basis for refusing
application.'9 The latter decisions are in the minority and, it is submitted,
12. Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurmberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519 (1926); Perutz
v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E2d 6 (1953). Note,
however, the discussion in Part III(A) (2) infra, concerning the effect of a federal dec-
laration of policy.
13. If not, the court is not required to take judicial notice of the law. N.Y. Cv.
PRAc. Acr § 344-a; In re Mason's Estate, 194 Misc. 30, 85 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
Normally, proof of foreign law presents a triable issue. Verfel v. Zinostenshm Banha,
287 N.Y. 91, 38 N.E.2d 382 (1941). As to correct pleading of foreign law, see Grossman
v. Western Financial Corp., 280 App. Div. 833, 114 N.Y.S.2d 193 (2d De.p't 1952).
14. The reference is to domestic, not conflict of laws, law since rcnaoi is not applied in
this field. Pan-American Securities Corp. v. Fried. Krupp Atiengesellschaft, 169 Misc.
445, 6 N.Y.S2d 993 (Sup. Ct 1938), affd, 256 App. Div. 955, 10 N.Y.S.2d 205 (2d Dep't
1939); Lann v. United Steel Works Corp., 166 Misc. 465, 1 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct.
1938). See, however, Estate of Schneider, 193 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S2d 653, reIcard,
198 Misc. 1030, 100 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
15. Domke, Foreign Exchange Restrictions (A Comnparative Surmy,), 21 J. Co-ip.
LEG. (3d Ser.) 54 (1939). A statistical count by the present writer demonstrates that the
courts more often refuse application to a later restriction than apply it, and more often
apply an earlier restriction than refuse it application.
16. RzsrATv-- rT, Coxiucr oF LAws §§ 584, 585 (1934).
17. Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhardt, 109 U.S. 527 (18Q83) ; Verfel v. Bohnische
Escompte-Bank und Credit Anstalt, 102 N.Y.L.J. 161, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. July 19, 1939).
But ree Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455, 461 (2d Cir. 1953).
18 Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. & Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 226, 20 N.E.2d
758 (1939), aff'd (by an equally divided court), 309 U.S. 624 (1940) ; Feuchtvanger v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd mern., 263
App. Div. 711, 31 N.Y.S2d 671 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 2,3 N.Y. 342, 43 N..E2d 434
(1942); Matter of Maria Liebl, 201 Misc. 1092, 106 N.Y.S.24 705 (Surr. Ct. 1951);
Matter of Theresie Liebl, 201 Misc. 1102, 106 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Dxc=,
CoxFricr or LAws 752 (6th ed. 1949).
19. Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 279 App. Div. 385, 110 N.Y.S.2d
446 (1st Dep't 1952), rev'd, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953); Sabl v. Laenderbanl:
WTen Aktiengesellschaft 30 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 1941), modified, 33 N.Y.S2d 764
(Sup. Ct. 1942), af'd, 266 App. Div. 832, 43 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1st Dep't 1943), i a' to
1953]
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are incorrect since they use a factor unrelated to the transaction to avoid the
holding which the selection process would otherwise require. 20
The status of the claimant is of interest because in some respects the claims
of non-resident aliens are treated differently from those of domestic creditors
or distributees.21 The connection of defendant with a transaction also has an
important bearing on the selection of law. A foreign guarantor's obligation
will be governed by different law from that of his principal. 22 The law of
the defendant's nationality or domicile, however, is no defense to him 23 un-
less the parties, by express agreement or necessary implication, can be said
to have contracted with reference to that law.24
As in conflicts law relating to contracts generally, place of performance
and place of contracting are the most important factors. Where the contract is
to be performed at the place at which it was made, the law of that place will be
applied,25 but, where places of making and of performance differ, the law of
appeal denied, 266 App. Div. 955, 44 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1st Dep't 1943); David v. Veitseher
Magnesitwerke Actien Gesellschaft, 348 Pa. 335, 35 A.2d 346 (1944) ; Domke, Mfoney in
the Law, 24 J. ComP. LEG. (3d Ser.) 51, 55 (1942) (review of NUSSBAUM). See N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. Act § 977-b.
20. Cases expressing the majority view are cited at note 59 in! ra.
21. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 227 (1942); Netherlands v. Federal
Reserve Bank, supra note 17, at 463; In re Kahn's Estate, 179 Misc. 939, 943, 38 N.Y.S,2d
839, 842 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
22. Cie. GCn6rale F. & P. v. Herzig & Sons Co., 89 Misc. 573, 153 N.Y. Supp, 717
(Sup. Ct. 1915). See Domke, supra note 15, at 60.
23. Matter of Maria Liebl and Matter of Theresie Liebl, supra note 18; Matter of
Muller, 199 Misc. 745, 104 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ; Marcu v. Fischer, 65 N.Y.S.2d
892 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; I) re Kahn's Estate, supra note 21. It makes no difference that it
is a corporation which pleads the defense. Guiness v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of London,
196 App. Div. 495, 188 N.Y..Supp. 137 (1st Dep't 1921); see N.Y. Civ. PaAc. Ac
§ 977-b, subd. 19.
24. Express agreement: Bercholz v. Guaranty Trust Co., 180 Misc. 1043, 44 N.Y.S,2d
148 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (plaintiff had submitted to decree); Kieve v. Basler Lebens-Ver-
sicherungs Gesellschaft, 182 Misc. 776, 45 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (provisions of
insurance policy). Necessary implication: Branderbit v. Hamburg American Line, 31
N.Y.S.2d 588 (App. Term 1941), aff'd inem, 266 App. Div. 1011, 45 N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d
Dep't 1943) (action between German nationals on a contract performable in Germany).
However, even express agreement cannot overthrow the public policy of the forum. See
text at note 48 infra.
25. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15
F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 585
(1936); Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d
6 (1953); Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798
(1938); Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of Fin-
land, 269 N.Y. 22, 198 N.E. 617, vwdified, 269 N.Y. 602, 199 N.E. 691 (1935), cert. denied,
297 U.S. 705 (1936). Some of the cases speak in terms of place of contracting, but
analysis shows the place of performance to have been the same. Deutsch v. Gutehoffnung-
shutte, 162 Misc. 872, 6 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Glynn v. United Steel Works
Corp., 106 Misc. 405, 289 N.Y. Supp. 1037 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
[Vol, 62: 867
RECOGNITION OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS
the latter will govern.20 Where the contract authorizes performance in any
of several places, the law governing the contract is fixed when the place of
performance actually is chosen.27 This rule has sometimes tempted courts, in
an effort to reach a particular result, into holding that the place of performance
shifts with the residence of the creditor 2 S or that, in a restitution case, the
place depends on where demand for repayment is made. One European
author has taken the position that there is "an implied condition in a promise
to pay, to remove the place of performance from one country to another, if
performance becomes impossible at the place where payment has been stipu-
lated to be made" ;30 it is believed that this position will not be followed by
United States courts.
Closely related to place of performance and place of contracting rules, but
also interwoven with public policy considerations, 3 ' are the doctrines relating
26. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutch-Atlantische Telegraphengesellschaft, 22 X.Y.S2d
581 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Hesslein v. Matzner, 19 N.Y.S.2d 402 (City Ct. 1940). See Swift
& Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 2S0 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1930); Mayer v. Hungarian
Commercial Bank of Pest, 21 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); cases cited note 25 supra
and note 27 infra; and, with respect to banks, N.Y. B.NK':G LAw §§ 138(1), 204-a
(3) (a).
27. Anglo-Continentale Treuhand A.G. v. St. Louis S'west Ry., 81 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 655 (1936) ; South American Petroleum Corp. v. Columbian Petro-
leum Co., 177 Misc. 756, 31 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Buxbaum v. Assicurazioni
Generali, 33 N.Y.S.2d 496, 34 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd cnm., 264 App. Div. 8 55,
36 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1st Dep't 1942); Kaplan v. Assicurazioni Generali, 34 N.Y.S2d 115
(Sup. Ct), aff'd ine., 264 App. Div. 855, 36 N.Y.S2d 191 (Ist Dep't 1942).
28. Gross v. Continental Caoutchouc-Export Aktien-Geselischaft, 175 Misc. 496, 24
N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1939), rcv'd on other grounds, 262 App. Div. Q6, 24 N.Y.S.2d
434 (2d Dep't 1941): David v. Veitscher Magnesitwerke Actien Gesellsechaft, 34S Pa.
335, 35 A.2d 346 (1944). This in effect is the use of a legal presumption to imply an agree-
ment for performance in any of several places and does not seem justified.
29. Kassel v. NA. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvart Nfaatschappij, 177 Misc.
92, 24 N.Y.S2d 450 (App. Term 1940), leave to appeal de-ied, 264 App. Div. 859, 35
N.Y.S.2d 730 (2d Dep't 1942). The general rule is that refund is to be made where the
money was paid, and the law of that place governs the right to restitution. American
Union Bank v. Swiss Bank Corp., 40 F2d 446 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Branderbit v. Hamburg
American Line, 31 N.Y.S.2d 588 (App. Term 1941), aff'd mere., 266 App. Div. 1011, 45
N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d Dep't 1943). In some cases, e.g., an agreement to hold funds until the
owner can take and possess them free from restrictions by foreign governments, a demand
is requisite to create a cause of action and to start the running of limitations, Dumbadze
v. Lignante, 244 N.Y. 1, 154 N.E. 645 (1926); Estate of Szeben, 127 N.Y.L.J. 529, col.
5 (Surr. Ct Feb. 6, 1952), but as a matter of choice of la, such demand is unimportant.
Thus in Sternm v. Pesti Magy-ar Kereskedelmi Bank, 303 N.Y. 831, 105 N.E2d 105 (1952),
the court affirmed without opinion against appellant's argument that the la, of Hungary
applied because a demand upon defendant bank for payment vas required to be made in
Hungary. See also Kleve v. Basler Lebens-Versicherungs Gesellschaft, supra note 24;
Van der Veen v. Amsterdamsche Bank, 178 Misc. 66S, 35 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
30. Pasching, in 67 JUnISTISCE BLkAE=r 52 (1938), as paraphrased in Domke,
supra note 15, at 60.
31. Domke, supra note 19, at 53; Nuss ,utm, MONEY IN THE LAw 491 (1939).
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to impossibility and illegality. Although the same result can be more logically
reached by holding that an exchange control factually cannot make impossible
the payment of money outside the country of restriction, 82 exchange control
cases rely on the rule that impossibility caused by foreign laws is no excuse.0A
In cases applying this rule, however, the foreign law referred to has not been
found to be the governing law under conflicts principles; where, as in the
case of a supervening regulation of the place of performance, it is the govern-
ing law, performance will be excused 34 -although, in a proper case, restitution
may be ordered. 5 But a supervening regulation of any state other than that
of performance will not be applied by American courts, 0
Similarly, where performaice is due in the forum, an existing regulation
of the place of contracting will not necessarily invalidate the contract,? nor
32. Domke, mupra note 15, at 56. See also Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v.
Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, supra note 25, 15 F. Supp. at 929; Perutz v. Bohe-
mian Discount Bank in Liquidation, supra note 19; Kleve v. Basler Lebens-Versicherungs
Gesellschaft, mupra note 24.
33. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellsehaft;
Deutsch v. Gutehoffnungshutte; Glynn v. United Steel Works Corporation, Siupra note
25 (even though in the GIy3tn case the contract used the language "so far as lawfully
possible"). In a restitution case the principle has -no application since the action is for
the return of the consideration paid for the performance which has failed. Sokoloff v.
National City Bank, 239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924). As to an existing restriction
the rule may influence the court's determination of place of performance, since the parties
will be presumed to have intended their contract to be valid and performable. South
American Petroleum Corp. v. Columbian Petroleum Co., supra note 27.
34. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellsehaft, supra note 25; see Mayer v. Hun-
garian Commercial Bank of Pest, supra note 26. As to contracts to be performed or de-
posits to be repaid at foreign offices of a domestic or a licensed foreign bank, see N.Y.
BANrXNG LAw §§ 138(1), 204-a(3) (a).
35. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft,
supra note 25. See also Richard v. ,Credit Suisse, 242 N.Y. 346, 152 N.E. 110 (1926);
Sokoloff v. National City Bank, supra note 33; RESTATEMENT, RESITmON § 108(c)
(1937).
36. See cases cited note 32 .supra, and Anglo-Continentale Treuhand A.G. v. St. Louis
S'west. Ry., supra note 27. Note, however, the line of English cases holding performance
excused by a restriction which prevents payment by a means or method deemed essential
to the contract. De Beeche v. South American Stores, Ltd., [1935] A.C. 148 (1934) ,
Ralli Bros. v. Compafiia Naviera Sota y Aznar, [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (C.A.); but cf. St.
Pierre v. South American Stores, Ltd., [1937] 1 All E.R. 206 (K.B. 1936), afJ'd, [1937]
3 All E.R. 349 (C.A.), the principle of which has been accepted by American authorities
in cases dealing with matters other than the payment of money, Texas Co. v. Hogarth
Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 (1921) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs § 460 (1932) ; 6 Wixms-
TON, CONTaAcTs § 1938 (Rev. ed. 1938), and has been adopted in modified form in § 2-614
(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
37. Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951); In re De Gheest's
Estate, 362 Mo. 634, 243 S.W.2d 83 (1951) ; In re De Montale's Estate, 199 Misc. 711,
107 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Surr. Ct. 1950); Weiss v. Lustig, 185 Misc. 910, 58 N.Y,S.2d 547
(Sup. Ct. 1945). But cf. Anglo-Continentale Treuhand A.G. v. St. Louis S'west. Ry., 81
F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 655 (1936); Estate of Strongman, 110 N.Y.L,J,
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will a foreign regulation (existing or supervening) render such performance
illegal in the forum, even though the effect is to recognize or require the doing
of an act illegal under the foreign law.3s If, however, performance is due in
the foreign state, a supervening regulation of that state wilv61, and an existing
regulation of that state may,40 render the contract unenforceable because il-
legal. Whether restitution will be ordered depends on whether the court finds
the parties to have been in pari delicto.41
In the last analysis, however, despite controversy among the writers,42 the
case law is clear that the intention of the parties determines the law govern-
ing a contract if there is a reasonable "contact" with the intended jurisdic-
tion.43 Furthermore, that intention need not be clearly expressed, but may
be presumed or implied.44 So, in determining what law the parties meant to
apply, the currency in which an obligation is payable has some weight;1 5 al-
though the fact that an obligation is payable in the currency of a particular
country will not, of itself, subject the obligation to the law of that country. °
1552, col. 6 (Surr. Ct. Nov. 30, 1943); RESTAT ENT, Co.s-rcr oF LA,':s §§ 332, 347
(1934).
38. In re De Gheest's Estate, supra note 37; Dutch-American Mercantile Corp. v.
Frank & Moloney, Inc., 124 N.Y.L.J. 569, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 1950); Kleinwort
Sons & Co. v. Ungarische Baumwolle Industrie Akt, [1939] 2 K.B. 678 (CA.).
39. Mayer v. Hungarian Commercial Bank of Pest, 21 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y.
1937); see N.Y. BANIxNG LAw §§ 13S(1), 204-a(3) (a).
40. On the ground of the forum's public policy and despite the validity of the con-
tract under the law of the place of making. One exchange control case has accepted this
doctrine, Hesslein v. Matzner, 19 N.Y.S.2d 462 (City Ct. 1940), but three have not,
Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 268 U.S. 552 (1925); Hughes Tool Co. v. United
Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1st Dep't 1952), affd nes., 304
N.Y. 942, 110 N.E.2d 884 (1953) ; Dutch-American Mercantile Corp. v. Frank & Maloney,
Inc., supra note 38, in situations to which it could have been applied.
41. Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, supra note 40; Note, 34 VA. L. RE%. 697, 704
(1948). But cf. Dutch-American Mercantile Corp. v. Frank & Moloney, Inc, supra note
38.
42. Compare Stimson, W7hich Law Should Gozvcru, 24 VA. L. REv. 74, G3 (193S),
Tiith Cook, 'Contracts' and the Conflict of Lazws: 'Intention' of the Parties, 32 ILL. L
REv. S99 (1938), and Goodrich, Yielding Place to New,: Rest Vcrsus Motion in the Con-
flict of Laws, 50 CoL. L. REv. 881, 898 (1950).
43. Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of Fin-
land, supra note 25; Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E.
897 (1934) ; Kleve v. Basler Lebens-Versicherungs Gesellschaft, sipra note 24; In re De
Gheest's Estate, supra note 37. The basic principle is adopted by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code in § 1-105.
44. Matter of Maria Liebl, 201 Misc. 1092, 106 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Surr. Ct 1951);
Goodman v. Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphengesellschaft, 166 Misc. 509, 2 N.Y.S2d 90
(Sup. Ct. 1938); Cie. GEn~rale F. & P. v. Herzig & Sons Co., 89 Misc. 573, 153 N.Y.
Supp. 717 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Hesslein v. Matzner, 19 N.Y.S.2d 462 (City Ct. 1940).
45. See Coghlan v. South Car. R.R., 142 U.S. 101, 110 (1891).
46. Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (18S9); Marine Ins. Co.
v. McLanahan, 290 Fed. 685 (4th Cir. 1923); NussBAui-, MO.N.Ey nz TrE LAw, NA-
TIONAL AND INTI ATIoNAL 348 (1950).
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In fact, all of the factors discussed above will be weighed to determine the
intention of the parties. 47 Only one factor limits the freedom of the parties;
they "may not by their intention, however expressed, override the laws of
the country in which suit is brought when a matter of public policy of that
country is involved." '48
The results produced by the above criteria are often cast aside by the courts
on this ground of "public policy."'49 The phrase covers such varying bases for
decision as that the regulation in question is confiscatory, 0 discriminatory,"1
or ex post facto,52 that it is a penal or revenue measure,63 is procedural in
47. The reason for applying the law of the place of performance is the presumed
intention of the parties. The situs of the property involved is considered in determining
intention, Pan-American Securities Corp. v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 169 Misc.
445, 451, 6 N.Y.S.2d 993, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 955, 10 N.Y.S.2d 205
(2d Dep't 1939) ; Marcu v. Fischer, 65 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1946), and so is nationality
and domicile, Branderbit v. Hamburg American Line, 31 N.Y.S.2d 588 (App. Term
1941), aff'd mere., 266 App. Div. 1011, 45 N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d Dep't 1943).
48. Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Batik of Finland,
269 N.Y. 22, 31-2, 198 N.E. 617, 621 (1935). Accord: Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Cor-
coran, 9 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925).
49. See, generally, Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Picblic, 25 VA. L. RaV. 37
(1938) ; Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Law's, 49
YALE L.J. 1027 (1940) ; Rashba, Foreign Exchange Restrictions and Public Policy hi
the Conflict of Laws, 41 MIclI. L. Ray. 777 and 1089 (1943). Distinguish, however, non-
recognition, which may result in refusal to apply laws of an unrecognized state, Russian
Socialist Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259 (1923); A/S Merilaid & Co,
v. Chase Nat. Bank, 189 Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1947); and note that
recognition does not require enforcement of laws which are contrary to the public policy
of the forum, Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Socey, 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897
(1934).
50. Bollack v. Societe Generale Pour Favoriser, etc., 263 App. Div. 601, 33 N.Y.S.2d
986, lease to appeal denied, 264 App. Div. 767, 35 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1st Dep't 1942). See
Plesch v. Banque National de la Republique D'Haiti, 273 App. Div. 224, 77 N.YS.2d 43
(1st Dep't), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 573, 81 N.E.2d 106 (1948); A/S Merilaid & Co. v.
Chase Nat. Bank, supra note 49; Sulyok v. Penzintezeti Kozlont Budapest, 279 App. Div.
528, 111 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1st Dep't), aff'd as modified, 304 N.Y. 704, 107 N.E.2d 60-4
(1952) ; Matter of Theresie Liebl, 201 Misc. 1102, 106 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ;
Marcu v. Fischer, 65 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; cf. Werfel v. Zivnostenska Banka,
260 App. Div. 747, 23 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1st Dep't 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 287 N.Y.
91, 38 N.E.2d 382 (1941).
51. Glynn v. United Steel Works Corp., 106 Misc. 405, 289 N.Y. Supp. 1037 (Sup.
Ct. 1935). See Pan-American Securities Corp. v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, supra
note 47.
52. Bollack v. Societe Generale Pour Favoriser, etc., supra note 50.
53. Ibid; Matter of Theresie Liebl, supra note 50; Matter of Maria Liebl, supra
note 44; Matter of Tahtabourounian, 198 Misc. 553, 102 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Surr. Ct. 1950) ;
International Investment Co. S.A. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 108 N.Y.L.J. 355, col. 7 (Sup.
Ct. Aug. 14, 1942) ; Friedmann, Foreign Exchange Control in Ainerican Courts, 26 Sr.
JoHN's L. REv. 97, 113 et seq. (1951).
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nature,54 or, in the absence of a treaty, does not have extraterritoriality,0 or
that the court will protect a domestic interest against a foreign law. 0G The
logic of a refusal to enforce a regulation actually confiscatory or discrimina-
tory 57 is evident, but the application of the other "public policy" bases to cases
of exchange control is only a means to an end. Ex post facto restrictions are
enforced against foreign nationals,5s and, indeed, to refuse retroactive enforce-
ment of such regulations is directly contrary to the governmental interest
which necessitated the regulation. Exchange regulations are neither penal nor
fiscal in purpose; they seek to protect the countryIs economy through pre-
serving international balances and internal markets. So also, the purpose for
which such restrictions are enacted makes clear that they are not simply pro-
cedural and that they are intended to have extraterritorial effect. The extra-
territoriality and protection-of-domestic-interest concepts have no greater base
in reason, for, if carried to their logical ends, no foreign law would ever be
applied.
Though that "unruly horse," public policy, appears to be guided more often
by predilection than by analysis, a survey of what the courts do (apart from
the reasoning advanced) shows that the concept will be applied or withheld as
the court finds the contacts with the forum to be substantial 19 and the in-
54. Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E2d 6
(1953); Meijer v. General Cigar Co., 73 N.Y.S.2d 576, 586 (Sup. Ct. 1947), rered on,
otlwr grounds, 273 App. Div. 760, 75 N.Y.S2d 536 (1st Dep't 1947). Rashba, supra
note 49, and Note, 34 V-. L. RL-. 697 (1948), also suggest that such a la, is "political*"
but no case so holding has been found.
55. A/S Mferilaid & Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank, supra note 49; Perkins v. DeNijtt, 197
Misc. 369, 94 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Marcu v. Fischer, supra note 50. And see
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 977-b, subd. 19.
56. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) ; In re Kahn's Estate, 179 Misc. 939,
38 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Surr. Ct. 1942); Guiness v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of London, 195
App. Div. 495, 183 N.Y. Supp. 137 (1st Dep't 1921); Matter of Maria Liebl, 201 Misc.
1092, 106 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Matter of Theresie Liebl, 201 Misc. 1102, 105
N.Y.S.2d 715 (Surr. Ct. 1951): N.Y. BANKrING LAW § 204-a(3) (b); Nadelmann, Le,3al
Treatment of Foreign and Domestic Creditors, 11 LAv, & Co::iw. Pno. 695 (1946).
57. The Uniform Commercial Code uses the language "discriminatory, oppressive or
predatory." § 2-614(2). And see Rashba, supra note 49, at 1099 n.203. The difficulty of
determining what is confiscatory is suggested by the conflict between Zinostensla Banl1a
Nat. Corp. v. Franlknan, [1950] A.. 57 (1949), and Matter of Theresie Liebl, stupra
note 56, as to the same Czech regulations. See also Anninger v. Hohenberg, 172 Misc.
1046, 18 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
58. In a number of the so-called "ticket cases," of which Branderbit v. Hamburg
American Line, supra note 47, is one, as well as in many of the cases cited ablve, the
regulation or decree was retroactive.
59. So, contacts being few and interest slight, the courts have held in a number of
cases that it is not against a state's public policy to hold a national to a contract made in
his own country to be performed there according to the lavs of that country. Perutz v.
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terests of the forum to be great.60 These are, however, relative terms which
lend themselves readily to abuse, so that what should be the exception tends
to become the rule. Of more than passing importance, therefore, is the ques-
tion: with what agency rests the final determination of the forum's public
policy?
A congressional act, as a national policy declaration in a field in which
federal authority is supreme,61 will be determinative. When there is no such
act, a deliberate determination by the executive department that specific
foreign decrees should or should not be recognized, will be binding on the
courts.62 When there is no formal expression by either of the political de-
partments of the Federal Government, it is the present practice of the courts
to speak in terms of a state policy determination while often relying on federal
indicia.63 While the law is by no means clear, reason appears to be on the
side of the Federal Government's position, 4 that, in such case, the determina-
tion must be of federal rather than state policy. Clearly, however, this does
not mean that state indicia not in conflict with federal policy must be ignored.
Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, supra note 54; Dougherty v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, supra note 49; Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y.
474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938) ; Branderbit v. Hamburg American Line, supra note 47. See
Rashba, upra note 49, at 1108; Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 697, 703 (1948). NussBtuAU, MONEY
ix THE LAW, NATIONAL AND INTERxATONAL 471 (1950), and DOmiE, CoNToRL or AuEu
PROPERTY 209 (1947), speak of the "relativity" of public policy.
60. Domke, spra note 19. at 55 et seq., speaks of "hostile," "prejudicial," and "tin.
just" measures; Nussbaum, supra note 49, at 1031, speaks of "an actual, strong and ad-
verse interest of the forum"; RESTATEMENT, CoNnic'r OF LAWS § 612 (1934) relates the
question to "strong" public policy. The forum's interests may also require that the for-
eign law be given effect. Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir.
1953); Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502
(1942) ; Amstelbank N.V. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 177 Misc. 548, 31 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup.
Ct. 1941).
61. As concerns exchange controls, federal supremacy is based on "the broad and
comprehensive national authority over the subjects of revenue, finance and currency."
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935).
62. See Part III(A) (2) infra.
63. That the use of federal indicia by a state court in determining policy is not un-
usual is evident from the cases, cited at note 205 infra, decided under § 269 of the N.Y.
Surrogate's Court Act, basing the withholding of payment of legacies to inhabitants of
Soviet-Bloc countries on the determination by the Secretary of the Treasury, made with
respect to checks drawn on United States funds, that there is no assurance that the payee
will actually receive payment.
64. Set forth in the amnicus curiae brief filed in the Court of Appeals in Werfl v.
Zivnostenska Banka, supra note 50, and in the "suggestion" filed by the United States
Attorney on .behalf of the Secretary of State in Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handel-
maatschappij, spra note 60. See Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, .=fpra note 60.
Federal policy, of course, governs in territory under United States occupation. Matter of
Muller, 199 Misc. 745, 104 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AGREE IXEZT-
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
Since we are concerned with the effect on United States law c produced
by Article VIII, Section 2(b), of the Agreement, it is necessary to advert
briefly to some of the constitutional issues involvedcO
The authorities 6 7 are clear that a "legislative-executive" agreement, 3 such
as resulted from the congressional authorization to accept the Fund Agree-
ment, is constitutional in form when, as here, the subjects dealt with are with-
in the competence of Congress.c2 They also hold that the due process clause
is not violated by an act invalidating previously existing contracts," provided
the congressional action is not arbitrary and capricious. 71 So no constitutional
65. It would unduly lengthen this article and invade fields completely beyond the
author's ken to attempt to analyze the municipal law of countries other than the United
States. Sufficient for an article intended primarily for the legal profession in the United
States to note that questions as to that law can arise neither in international nor in
United States law courts. In the former, the question would be barred by the represen-
tation made under art. XX, § 2, of the Agreement and by the rule of international law
which prevents a state from advancing its own municipal law as a ground for invalidating
an agreement, see Cases of Serbian and Brazilian Loans, P.C.IJ., Ser. A, No. 20121, at
46-7 (1929); WIuLOUGHny, FUNDAMENTAL CONCar'rs OF Purmc L4w 313-14 (1924);
Levitan, Executive Agreements, 35 ILL. L. Rmr. 365, 393 (1940); in the latter, by the
rule of domestic law which holds inquiry into the authority under foreign law to enter
into an international agreement to be a "political" matter for decision by our executive
department, Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635 (U.S. 1853) ; Russia v. National City Ban!: of
N.Y., 69 F.2d 44, 47-S (2d Cir. 1934), or by the rule that the governmental acts of a
foreign country done within its own borders are not subject to examination by our courts
in order to determine whether or not those acts were legal under the municipal law of
the foreign state, Underhill v. Hernandez, 16S U.S. 250 (197); Banco de Espana v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940) ; cf. United States v. Watkdns, 159
F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1947).
66. Limitations of space prevent consideration of the delegation of power problems.
They are, however, answered in a Joint McInorandum of the Treasury Ge:eral Counsel
and the Assistant Secretary [later Secretary] of State, which is reprinted in Hcarings
before Senate Committee on Banhing & Currency on H.R. 3314, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
529-62 (1945).
67. The literature is abundant. See Borchard, Shall the Exectitve Agreement Re-
place the Treaty?, 53 YA=m L.J. 664 (1944), and Treaties and Executve Agreeenmts-
A Reply, 54 YAL, LJ. 616 (1945); McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-
Executive or Presidential Agreenents: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy,
54 YAi. L.J. 181 and 534 (1945).
68. 40 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 469 (1946) uses this expression.
69. Both the monetary powers and the powers over foreign commerce would sustain
this Agreement.
70. Overnight Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240
(1934).
71. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
887 (1948) ; Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F2d 266 (6th Cir. 194S), cert. den icd,
335 U.S. 902 (1949). But see Moss v. Havraiian Dredging Co., 187 F2d 442 (9th Cir.
1951).
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infirmity results from retroactive application of Article VIII, Section 2(b),
to controls existing before the Agreement (or before a new member became a
member, or before a member adopted a permissible control), nor from the fact
that the section gives internal effect to foreign law not otherwise applicable
under conflicts rules.7
2
What is the constitutional effect of the executive agreement under con-
sideration? Since it is a congressional-executive agreement, it would be
supreme law of the land 73 even in the absence of Section 11 of the Act.1 4
With that section of the Act serving as evidence of an intention to override
state laws,"5 it is beyond cavil that Article VIII, Section 2(b), of the Agree-
ment, in every situation to which it applies, is supreme law of the land and
takes precedence over contrary state policy.76
III. THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE FIRST SENTENCE OF
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2(b)
(A) Tools for Interpretation
Professor Nussbaum's conclusion that Article VIII, Section 2(b), is of
little importance in legal practice is drawn from his premises that "exchange
contracts" are limited to transactions in international media of payment, that
an exchange regulation is not consistent with the Agreement unless the
country promulgating it has taken steps to give its provisions internal law
effect, that the section provides only for unenforceability of contracts void
under foreign law, and that it applies only to the regulations of the country
whose currency-as distinguished from other exchange resources-is in-
volved.77 These premises lose validity, however, when viewed in the light of
72. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), was such a situation. See Stevenson,
Effect of Recognition on the Application of Private International Law Norms, 51 CoL. L.
REv. 710, 721 (1951).
73. "Not as a treaty but by authority of an Act of Congress." Dodd, International
Relations and the Treaty Power, 30 A.B.A.J. 360 (1944). See 40 OPs. Av'rv GEE. 469
(1946). See also Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) ; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941).
74. 59 STAT. 516 (1945), 22 U.S.C. §286(h) (1946): "[T]he first sentence of
Article VIII, Section 2(b) . .. shall have full force and effect. .. ."
75. The intention is also made clear by the statement, made in H.R. REP. No. 629,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1945), and SEN. REP. No. 452, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1945),
that:
"It also gives effect to that portion of the fund agreement which provides
that when other member countries have exchange controls which are con-
sistent with the articles of agreement, United States courts will not enforce
exchange contracts that violate such controls."
76. Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E,2d
6 (1935) ; cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937).
77. NussBAum, MONEY IN THE LAw, NATIONAL AND INENATONAL 542-5 (1950);
Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421,
426-9 (1950).
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the purpose, legislative history, and context of the provision; the context of
the entire Agreement; the interpretation issued by the Executive Directors
of the Fund 78 under Article XVIII of the Agreement ; - and the usual rules
of construction, 0 which call for liberal interpretation and relate interpretation
to purpose, context, and natural and reasonable meaning. To set the scene for
this analysis, however, it will be necessary to provide a brief rtsum of the
legislative history and to ascertain the effect to be given the Fund interpreta-
tion.
(1) Legislative History 81
The provision which became Article VIII, Section 2(b), first appeared as
part of a section headed "Foreign Exchange Dealings Based on Par Values" ;s-
it read as follows:
78. Issued July 14, 1949, and reported in IN;TERPNATIONAL M.%OnTARY FULND, AxNmL
REPORT 1949, app. XIV (1949), reissued by the National Advisory Council, 14 Fin. REG.
5208 (1949) (hereinafter cited as "Fund interpretation").
79. "(a) Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement arising
between any member and the Fund or between any members of the Fund shall be sub-
mitted to the Executive Directors for their decision....
"(b) In any case where the Executive Directors have given a decision under (a)
above, any member may require that the question be referred to the Board of Governors,
whose decision shall be final ....."
In a recent FCC proceeding, these contentions were raised: that such an interpreta-
tion was not final because appealable to the Board of Governors; that it was uItrd Tires
the Executive Directors because the question arose between private companies and the
Fund; that causing request for an interpretation to be made was tdtfra Tires the National
Advisory Council. These contentions were overruled. International Bank for Reccon. &
Devel. and International Monetary Fund v. All America Cables & Radio, Inc., FCC
Docket No. 9362, Hearing Examiner's decision, Nov. 20, 1951, affirmed by the Com-
mission, lar. 23, 1953. The interpretation there involved had been made unanimously
more than a year and a half previously, the National Advisory Council had indicated that
the United States did not intend to appeal, and no other member had taken any steps to
do so. On the second point see Lattimer's Lessee v. Poteet, 14 Pet. 4, 14 (U.S. 1840);
Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602, 609 (D. Utah 1951). The third point is not
applicable to the July 14, 1949, interpretation.
80. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 234
U.S. 30 (1931) ; United States v. D'Anterive, 10 How. 609 (U.S. 1850).
81. The history of the Agreement is published in PRocEINxGs AND Docuc =xTs o7
THE UNim NATIO-s MoNETARY AN,,D FiNANTcIAL CoNT .cr, PuEw&Tbozz No. 2,36,
INT'L ORG. AND Cox-. Sm. 1, No. 3 (U.S. Dept State 1948). The documents relating
to art. VIII, §2(b), are (page references are to P013u cmxaOx No. 206): 32 (p. 54) ;
172 (p. 217) ; 191 (p. 230) ; 236 (p. 334) ; 238 (p. 341) ; 397 (p. 502) ; 326 (pp. 542-3) ;
343 (pp. 575-6) ; 370 (p. 599) ; 374 (p. 605) ; 393 (p. 628) ; 413 (p. 671) ; 44S (p. 803).
The history of the Act shows that it was originally introduced in joint bills, H.R.
2211 and S. 540, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). After hearings on H.R. 2211 before
the House Committee on Banking and Currency, the bill was rewritten and introduced
as H.R. 3314, on which all further proceedings in the House and Senate were had. Ex-
cept for the statement from the House and Senate reports quoted in note 75 sutpra, and
the fact that one of the amendments made in rewriting was the addition of § 13, requir-
ing that an official interpretation be obtained, the history of the Act is not significant.
82. This section finally became art. IV of the Agreement. It vras intended to be an
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"Exchange transactions in the territory of one member involving
the currency of any other member, which evade or avoid the ex-
change regulations prescribed by that other member and authorized
by this Agreement, shall not be enforceable in the territory of any
member."8 3
Poland proposed a requirement of cooperation among members "to render
really effective" controls and regulations for the purpose of regulating inter-
national movements of capital, 4 and the United Kingdom proposed a change
in the last line of the paragraph from "not be enforceable" to "be an offense."8 5
The Drafting Committee rejected the United Kingdom proposal, but favored
cooperation among members and submitted for consideration the following
language:
"Exchange transactions in the territory of one member involving
the currency of any other member which are outside the prescribed
variation from parity set forth in (a) above shall not be enforceable
in the territory of any member country.
"Each member agrees to cooperate with other members in their
efforts to effectuate exchange regulations prescribed by such mem-
bers in accordance with this Agreement."80
Commission I of the Conference referred the question to a Special Com-
mittee which recommended that the Drafting Committee be asked (1) to
reconcile the difference between its language and that of the earlier version,
quoted above, "to indicate that there is no intent of imposing criminal rather
than civil penalties," and (2) to consider parallel stipulations for dealing with
non-member countries.8 7
The Drafting Committee then reported out as Article VIII, Section 2(b),88
a provision which, with minor revisions, became the final text. Aside from
the reference in the Second Report of the Drafting Committee to the pro-
vision as a "new formulation," 89 there is nothing in the history to explain
the major textual changes made by the Drafting Committee, or the trans-
planting of the provision from Article IV to Article VIII. That the trans-
position occurred suggests, however, that the "new formulation" was the
statement of a principle of general application (Article VIII), rather than
one directly related to the par value of currencies (Article IV).00
elaboration of art. IX, § 2, of the Joint Statement, which stated as a purpose: "Not to
allow exchange transactions in its market in currencies of other members at rates outside
a prescribed range based on the agreed parties."
83. Document 32, supra note 81.
84. Document 191, ibid.
85. Document 236, ibid.
86. Document 307, ibid.; considered in Documents 326, 343, ibid.
87. Document 374, ibid.
88. Document 413, ibid.
89. Document 448, ibid.
90. The transposition also explains the discrepancy between the title of § 2 ("Avoid-
ance of restrictions on current payments") and the broad language of subsection (b), as
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(2) Binding Effect of the Fund Interpretation
Professor Nussbaum takes the position that decisions of the Fund authorities
are not binding on private persons.01 It is submitted, however, that, except as
the Fund interpretation is overridden by a later congressional or executive
determination, and subject to the proviso that the Fund may not, under the
guise of interpretation, engage in legislation,02 United States courts will give
conclusive effect in private litigation to Fund interpretations.
It seems clear that Congress, in passing the Bretton Woods Agreement
Act, so intended, even though Article XVIII is not listed among the Agree-
ment provisions which are to have the "force of law."03 Clearly, Congress
was aware of the interpretation provision, for Section 13 of the Act requires
that an official interpretation be obtained. Congress was also aware of the
obligation to make Article VIII, Section 2(b), effective under municipal
law,94 and of the requirement that each government certify that it had taken
all steps necessary to carry out all of its obligations under the Agreement.05
Congress had also been advised that the Act contained all additional legis-
lative authority necessary to permit the making of that certification.O0 It must,
therefore, be concluded that Congress understood the binding effect of Fund
interpretations.
Nor does the fact that Article XVIII of the Agreement refers only to
questions arising betveen a member and the Fund itself or between Fund
members militate against the conclusion that interpretations of Article VIII,
well as the failure to be more specific in art. XIV, §§ 2, 3, in referring to the "obligations"
of art. VIII, § 2. As to the former, the title of the section clearly does not refer to
§ 2(b), which relates to the enforcement rather than avoidance of restrictive regulations.
For this reason, and because § 6 of art. VIII implies that such restrictions may relate to
both current and capital transfers (the latter being permitted under art. VI, § 3), it seems
clear that the title of the section cannot be seized upon as limiting the scop2 of the sec-
tion. As to art XIV, see notes 124, 125 and related text infra.
91. NussAu ,s, MONEY IN THE LAw, NATIONzAL AND INTERNATIONAL 529, 542 L44
(1950). (Professor Nussbaum's analysis of this problem and of art. VIII, § 2(b),
originally appeared in Exchange Control and the International Monetar, Fand, 59
Y LE L.J. 421 (1950)). See M6ann, Confiscatory Legislation aW:d Share Certifieates, 11
MoD. L. REv. 479 (1948), as to the English law. Nussbaum recognizes, however, that
such interpretations may "carry weight" in private litigation, apparently having in mind
the treaty interpretation rule giving weight to the practical construction of the parties
to the treaty.
92. See the colloquy between Representatives Smith and Sabath, 91 Co,,G. RE.
5536-8 (1945) ; and NussBAull, op. cit. supra note 91, at 529.
93. As pointed out in Part II supra, the Agreement would be supreme law of the
land even had the "force of law" provision, 59 STAT. 516 (1945), 22 U.S.C. §286(h)
(1946), been omitted from the Act.
94. The obligation is set forth in art. VIII, § 1. See also paragraph 2 of the Fund
interpretation.
95. Art. XX, § 2.
96. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banhing and Currency on H.R. 3314,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 556-8 (1945).
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Section 2(b), bind private rights. The interpretation function was not set
up for the determination of private rights, but Article VIII, Section 2(b),
being restricted as it is to civil unenforceability, deals only with private rights.
The Agreement, which is supreme law of the land, makes interpretations
issued under its provisions final. If those interpretations are not final in pri-
vate litigation, how reconcile the presence in the Agreement of both the inter-
pretation provision and Article VIII, Section 2(b)? Moreover, at least as
to interpretations of Article VIII, Section 2(b), the "force of law" provision
must be considered to include interpretations to which, under Article XVIII
of the Agreement, it is subject.
It is not necessary, however, to rely solely on what appears in the Agree-
ment and the Act, 7 for the State Department has made clear its position
"that the United States Government is committed to support" such interpre-
tations. 98 It may, therefore, be expected that a certificate or suggestion of
the State Department concerning the Fund interpretation under discussion
will be forthcoming in cases dealing with currency regulations of Fund mem-
bers. Since the courts hold themselves concluded by a deliberate determination
of the State Department that the acts or decrees of a foreign government
should or should not be recognized, 99 they will give conclusive effect to the
97. Additional arguments may be made (a) that the Act is a continuing authorization
(similar to the Trade Agreements legislation) permitting the Executive to enter into
further agreements by accepting (whether or not he concurs in) an interpretation
made under art. XVIII, (b) that the interpretation as the practical constructioll of the
parties is entitled to great weight, Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929), and (c) that
because the July 14, 1949, interpretation was reissued by the National Advisory Council,
it is the Executive's construction and as such is entitled to great weight, Sullivan v. Iidd,
254 U.S. 433 (1921).
98. Letter from Department of State to FCC, dated Jan. 25, 1951, in International
Bank for Recon. & Devel. and International Monetary Fund v. All America Cables &
Radio, Inc., FCC Docket No. 9362, mimeo. p. 14, Mar. 23, 1953. See also letter from De-
partment of State to FCC, dated June 2, 1950, ibid.
99. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951), in which the court held itself bound by a
certificate of the Secretary of State that the incorporation of Latvia by the USSR and the
nationalization decrees of the resulting regime had not been recognized by the United
States. The court stated:
"We are of the opinion that when the executive branch of the Government
-has determined upon a foreign policy, which can be and is ascertained, and
the non-recognition of specific foreign decrees is deliberate and is shown to
be part of that policy, such non-recognition must be given effect by the
courts. The rule applicable in such circumstances is the same rule applicable
to an act of recognition. Any other treatment of A deliberate policy and act
of non-recognition would reduce the effective control over foreign affairs by
the executive branch to a mere effectiveness of acts of recognition. The
control of the executive branch over foreign affairs must necessarily be
broader than that." 188 F.2d at 1003.
See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir.
1944) ; Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1945). But see Anderson
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executive's determination that Fund interpretations must be recognized in
private litigation concerned with currency restrictions.0 0
(B) Meaning of the Provision
(1) "Exchange Contracts"
Since there is no precedent of any value,101 we must look to the legislative
history, the context of the Agreement, and the rules of construction for the
meaning of the phrase 'exchange contracts."
Professor Nussbaum concludes that the phrase is limited to international
media of payment and, therefore, excludes securities, merchandise, and the
like. He reasons that the scope of "exchange transaction" is limited to inter-
national media of payment, and that Article VIII, Section 2(b), was revised
from "exchange transaction" to "exchange contract," which must be con-
sidered of even narrower significance. 0 2 The context of the Agreement clear-
ly demonstrates, however, that an "exchange transaction"--which includes
within its scope a "movement," 10 3 an "operation,"'' 10 a "contract,"' 105 as well
as a "transaction"'(0 --covers a broad range of dealings. The fact that in a
number of instances the Agreement contains language limiting the phrase to
media transactions ' 0 7 indicates that the drafters knew how to limit the phrase
v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 2S9 N.Y. 9, 20, 43 N.E2d 502, 507 (1942).
The doctrine and its development are fully dealt with in Note, Jvdicial Deference to
the State Department on International Legal Issies, 97 U. or P.. L. Rrv. 79 (1943). See
also JAFFE, JuDICIAL AsPEcTs oF ForEGN RELATio,,s (1933); Finklstein, Judicial Self-
Limitation, 37 H.Lv. L. Ruv. 33S (1924); Stevenson, Effect of Recognition on the Appli-
cation of Private International Law Norms, 51 Cot. L. Rmr. 710, 725-8 (1951) ; Weston,
Political Questions, 38 HAnv. L. REv. 296 (1925).
100. The cases holding that interpretations of the political departments do not con-
clude the judiciary, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1399); Z. & F. Assets Realization
Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd, 311 U.S. 470 (1941); Banco de
Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1940), are not contrary since
we are dealing not with an executive interpretation, but with the executive's determina-
tion that the Fund's interpretation must be recognized.
101. The only pre-agreement case found which specifically defines the phrase, Bank
of China, Japan, & the Straits, Ltd. v. American Trading Co., [1394] A.C. 20, is clearly
inapplicable since it dealt with a term of local trade. The problem has been mentioned in,
but not decided by, post-agreement cases.
102. Nussmur, op. cit. supra note 91, at 542. See also id. at 543. Cabat, Exchange
Control and the Conflict of Laws: An Unsolved Pttle, 99 U. oF PA. L Rwv. 476, 495
(1951), adopts Nussbaum's view.
103. Art. VI, § 3.
104. Art.VII, §3(b).
105. Art. VIII, §2(b), together with art. VIII, §6.
106. A "current transaction" is defined by art. XLX, § (i), to include "foreign trade,
other current business, including services, and normal short-term banking and credit
facilities." Note also the broad meaning of the word "transaction" as used in art. V,
§7(b) (ii), art. VIII, §4(b) (ii), and art. XI, § 1(iii).
107. Either by specific statement: art. IV, § 3 ("exchange transactions between the
currencies") and § 4(b) ("exchange transactions between its currency and the currencies
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when they wanted to and bears out the conclusion that "exchange transaction"
is not limited to transactions in international media of payment.
We may agree that the first and second versions of Article VIII, Section
2(b), relating as they did to parity, used the words "exchange transaction"
in their narrow sense. However, with the expansion of the concept of the
provision to cover exchange control regulations dealing not only with trans-
actions in currency, but also with purchases of commodities, transfers of real
and personal property, payment of tort obligations and the like,108 the phrase
"exchange transactions" became in its narrow sense too limited, in its broad
sense too amorphous to retain. With the "new formulation," "exchange con-
tracts" became the appropriate phrase. It was consistent with the expansion
of concept implicit in the rephrasing and transposition of the provision 109
and yet did not so far extend the provision as to make it applicable to tort
claims, for example, about which there might be considerations of policy which
would make unacceptable the application of another country's exchange con-
trols.
Nor is it logical to suppose that the phrase "exchange contracts" is used
in an even narrower sense than media transactions. The broad declaration of
purposes of the Agreement, ° the rule of liberal construction, the widely
varying purposes for which the Agreement allows controls, and the broad
range of transactions normally covered by such controls suggest that an "ex-
change contract" covers equally as great a range as an "exchange transaction,"
and differs only in that the word "contract" necessitates that there be a con-
sensual or contractual basis. The illogic of the contrary position, which would
render media transactions unenforceable but would leave untouched the quan-
titively greater-and thefefore more harmful-dealings in other forms of prop-
erty and services, substantiates that result.
of other members") ; art. XV, § 3 ("transactions of the Fund in its currency") ; or by
implication: art. XX, § 4(a), (c), (d), (h), (i) (relating to the beginning or postpone-
ment of "exchange transactions" by the Fund). The implication would be that these were
media transactions since the Fund presumably will not deal with other than media.
108. See, e.g., Military Law 53 for the U.S. Zone of Germany, quoted in Matter of
Muller, 199 Misc. 745, 104 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
109. This broad view of the provision is also substantiated by comparing the second
version with the final one. The second version, which was limited to cases of variation
from parity, included an obligation upon members to cooperate in the effectuation of ex-
change regulations generally. In the final version the parity limitation of the first sentence
was removed, and the obligation of the second sentence was reduced to permission to
enter into mutual accords. This strongly suggests that some part, or all, of the former
obligation is now covered by the first sentence. See Documents 326, 343, supra note 81.
110. To promote international monetary cooperation (cl. i), promote exchange sta-
bility, maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members (cl. iii), and shorten the
duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments
to members (cl. vi.). Clause iv, relating to elimination of foreign exchange restrictions,
does not negate the conclusion drawn in the text, since the restrictions dealt with by art.
VIII, § 2(b), are sanctioned by the Agreement.
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We are thus led to the conclusion that the term "exchange contracts," as
used in Article VIII, Section 2(b), means transactions having their bases in
contract and involving exchange, whether of currency, property, or services."'
Such contracts must however be deliberate (based on consent in fact, whether
formally stated as in a bilateral contract, or implied from the facts as in a uni-
lateral contract) rather than imputed (based on consent imputed by law, as
the implied contract to return embezzled funds). The purpose in limiting the
provision to contract cases would appear to have been to exclude matters not
based on volition, thus reducing the area in which policy arguments against
the "extraterritorial" application of foreign regulations might be made. Put
another way, the policy considerations involved in consigning to the area of
unenforceability (in the interest of international cooperation) a deliberate
contract violative of a control regulation are very much different from those
concerned with the unenforceability vel zon of a non-voluntary right or obli-
gation; the adverse effect on international cooperation of excluding the latter
from the provision's scope is relatively slight. Particularly is this true when
it is remembered that what we are considering is unenforceability, not enforce-
ability.
Once it is determined that such a deliberate contract exists, it does not
matter where the contract was made, whether or not it involved exchange
at its inception (provided only that exchange is involved at the time the
question arises), or whether or not the proceeding in which the question is
raised is between the parties to the contract.- The first conclusion follows
from the legislative history of the provision ;113 the second and third con-
clusions, from the absence of limiting language in the provision and from its
broad purpose. That purpose and the necessity (under the law of nations)
for uniform interpretation of the Agreement, also make it clear that domestic
law rules relating to the form of action 114 may not be seized upon as the basis
for holding that a consensual obligation, because it is not a "contract," is out-
side of the provision's coverage.
With these criteria, we may consider some specific instances. The obvious
exclusions which come to mind are torts and the devolution of property ky
111. This view was first expressed by Mann, in MIoacy in Public Intcr:al.,u:al
Law, 26 BRiT. Y.B. I'NTL L. 259, 279 (1949), and represented a substantially broader
view than he had expressed in The Exchange Cont rol Act, 1947, 10 MoD. L. Rmw. 411
(1947).
112. See Part 111(B) (7), at pages S94-5 inira.
113. The first and second versions of the provision related to exchange transactions
"in the tenitory" of a member, whereas that phrase does not appear in the final version.
114. For example, the English rule which permits a third party beneficiary to sue
only in certain exceptional cases in which a trust can be found, and in those cases requires
that the action be one to enforce the trust. The result is nk.netheless the enforcement Ua
the contract. Of course, if under private international law criteria no ubligatiun exists
because consideration, a properly formalized writing, or privity of contract is lazlzing,
the question of whether the Agreement applies will never be reached.
19531
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
will or intestacy. Clearly, also, such obligations as the deposit of security for
costs 11 6 or the filing of a bond in an attachment or injunction proceeding are
not "contracts." On the other hand, such closely kindred matters as an action
on an attachment bond, or rights arising under an inter vivos trust agree-
ment would be included.1 16 And, it would seem, the exclusion urged by Dr.
Mann "17-- of claims in rein and all claims by an owner of a chattel against
a possessor-is too broad, since such claims are often founded on contract. 118
Finally, it would appear that a judgment based on contract must be considered
within the provision to the same extent that the underlying contract would
be, for otherwise an obvious means of circumventing the provision would
exist.
(2) "Involve the Currency"
The evidence on which we have based our conclusion that "exchange con-
tracts" are not limited to media of payment transactions points to the parallel
conclusion that neither does the phrase "involve the currency" impart such a
limitation. Support for this conclusion is to be found in the meaning of the
word "involve," which not only denotes the ideas of "including" or "contain-
ing" but also the ideas of "implicating," "affecting," "relating to," and "being
connected with." Foreign trade contracts or security transactions affect, im-
plicate, relate to, or connect with the currency of a country just as strongly
as dealings in the currency itself, if not more so. Thus the purchase of Italian
hemp for English pounds involves lire as well as pounds, since the expot
sale of hemp produces an Italian exchange resource and directly relates to
the international value of Italian lire.11
On this basis, Professor Nussbaum's example of pounds exchanged in Paris
for lire 120 would be within the scope of Article VIII, Section 2(b), if Eng-
lish or Italian regulations were violated. And if the pounds or lire were phy-
sically within France, or owned by a French resident even if located outside
France, they would also be French exchange assets; in such a case, the trans-
action would also be within the scope of the provision if French regulations
were violated. It should be noted, however, that it is the location of the asset
or residence of the party which is the important factor, not the geographic
location of the transaction. No practical or logical reason exists for subjecting
115. See Note, 77 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 743 (France 1950), comment-
ing on a decision of the Vienna Court of Appeals.
116. Cf. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 181
Misc. 202, 40 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (attachment bond).
117. See citations at notes 91, 111, supra.
118. Thus Kahler v. Midland Bank, Ltd., [1949] 2 All E.R. 621 (H.L.), involved
causes of action in contract and in detinue based on the same deposit of securities.
119. NUSSBAUM, op. cit. supra note 91, at 543, somewhat reluctantly concedes that
more than one currency can be involved.
120. Id. at 544.
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a transaction to French regulation when its sole relation to the interests of
France is that the physical transaction occurs within her territory. As we
have observed, the legislative history of the provision shows that such a con-
cept was abandoned.
It may be urged that the construction here advanced is extreme, because,
under this interpretation, even a barter transaction will "involve the cur-
rency" of the countries whose exchange resources are concerned. This is,
however, the logical result of the language used and a reasonable construction
in view of the purpose of the provision. More convincing arguments against
the positions here adopted are: (1) since every international contract relates
to currency, property, or service, each of which is an exchange asset, the
words "involve the currency" are redundant in view of the requirement that
the contract be an "exchange" contract; (2) as an extension of the first argu-
ment, the result of the constructions so far advanced is to make the provision
read, "contracts involving exchange which are contrary to the exchange con-
trol regulations of any member . . ."-which is not the language used. The
answer to the first argument is that the exact form of the language is an
historical accident, carried over from a parity provision. As for the second,
it may be said that though the quoted language would more clearly have
carried out the purpose and intent of the Agreement, the above construction
is not, in the light of that purpose and intent and of the history, a forced, un-
natural, or unreasonable reading of the provision as it was adopted.
(3) "Member"
The Agreement is explicit that both original members and those later elected
to the Fund are members from the time of deposit of the respective member's
instrument of acceptance with the United States Government.' The Agree-
ment also specifies that a voluntary withdrawal from membership is effective
on the date written notice of withdrawal is received by the Fund at its prin-
cipal office.12 2 It does not explicitly cover a member required by Board
decision to withdraw,12 3 but presumably the determinative date will be that
of the Board decision unless the decision otherwise specifically so provides.
It is also clear from the Fund interpretation 12 4 and from the practical absurd-
ities which would otherwise result,12 that the fact that a member avails it-
121. Art. XX, §2(b). As to original members the section contains a now irrelevant
condition.
122. Art.XV, § 1.
123. Art.XV, §2(b).
124. "2. By accepting the Fund Agreement, members have undertaken to make the
principle mentioned above effectively part of their national lawv. This applies to all mem-
bers, whether or not they have availed themselves of the transitional arrangements of
Article XIV, section 2."
125. For e-ample, there would be no reciprocity of obligation. And during the tran-
sitional period (when, presumably, more control regulation wili be in effect) the pllicy
of art. VIII, § 2(b), would be more limited in scope than in a later period (vhen there
will be less need for that policy because of the fewer regulations then e.dsting).
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self of the transitional arrangements provided for in Article XIV does not
exclude it from the operation of Article VIII, Section 2(b).
(4) "Contrary"
There is nothing in either the meaning of the word "contrary" or the legis-
lative history to support Professor Nussbaum's conclusion that the provision
"provides only for international unenforceability of contracts void under for-
eign law.' 26 If a contract required by applicable regulations to be licensed
is carried out without a license, the regulation has been equally contravened
whether it speaks in terms of a criminal or void act or only in terms of tn-
enforceability.127 There would have been consistency to the Professor's argu-
ment if the effect of the Agreement provision were to void contracts with which
it deals; but, as we have seen, the concept of "offense" was abandoned in favor
of one of unenforceability. There is no reason, then, to import a stronger re-
quirement as to the domestic regulation involved. Indeed, there is every reason
not to do so, for the result would be the emasculation of the provision: few ex-
change controls go to the extreme of voiding the contracts with which they deal.
On the other hand, the change from "evade or avoid" in the first version to
"contrary" in the final version of the provision shows that "contrary" is used
in the sense of evasion, not avoidance. One consequence of this is that while
a sale of machinery by an English company to a French manufacturer for
dollars will be unenforceable unless French exchange control regulations are
complied with, a guaranty of the dollar payment by an American firm (so
long as not in violation of any American regulation) will be enforced. This
results from the fact that, though the contract of guaranty avoids the effect
of the French regulation, it is a separate and distinct contract not involving
French exchange resources. This follows even though the arrangement be-
tween the French manufacturer and the American firm, as a result of which
the guaranty is issued, itself contravenes the French regulation and would be
unenforceable.
(5) "Exchange Control Regulations"
The context and purpose of the Agreement and the natural meaning of the
phrase suggest that "exchange control regulations" are enactments which con-
trol the movement of exchange assets (currency, property, or services) for
126. NussBAum, op. cit. supra note 91, at 545 (emphasis added). Compare Wouxy,
PIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 475 (2d ed. 1950), which indicates that "contrary" means
only "inconsistent with."
127. Apparently Professor Nussbaum experienced some doubts between the writing of
the article, Exchange Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421
(1950), and the publication of the same material as part of his book, MONEY IN T11r LAw,
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL (1950), for in the former he said with respect to an un-
licensed contract (at 429), "Such contracts may be enforced elsewhere," while in the
latter (at 545) he omitted that sentence from the otherwise identical paragraph.
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purposes related to the financial policy of the controlling country.12- The
title or designation of such a regulation is not controlling. But the present
day interrelation of financial and trade restrictions '- necessitates a distinc-
tion betveen various regulations on the basis of the purpose of the regulatory
technique employed. In most cases the distinction is obvious: the foreign funds
controls maintained during the last war and recently reimposed with respect
to China are exchange controls: but tariff regulations, though related directly
to fiscal policy and having a limiting effect on the movement of exchange,
are not. And a price control regulation, though it may contain provisions de-
signed to strengthen or complement exchange controls,co is not itself an ex-
change control. In other cases a greater degree of refinement is required: as
we have above indicated, a barter provision included as a complementary part
of an exchange control is within Article VIII, Section 2(b), but a barter pro-
vision of a regulation governing the export or import of a particular com-
modity is not. In the excluded cases the primary purpose of the regulation
is revenue or price stabilization; transactions contrary to such regulations are
not rendered unenforceable by the Agreement provision.
(6) "Maintahed or Imposed ConsstCeztly wth this Agreement"
A reading of the Agreement supplies reasonably clear criteria with which
to determine whether or not a regulation is consistent with it. It permits the
maintenance or imposition of "such controls as are necessary to regulate in-
ternational capital movements,"' 3' of "limitations on the freedom of exchange
operations in the scarce currency,"'' 3 - of "restrictions on the making of pay-
128. Campare Friedmann, Forcign Exchange Control in An.-rican: Courts, 24 Sr.
JoHN's L. REv. 97, 104 n.27 (1951) (protection of the domestic currency), uithi Hushes
Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 219 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S.2d 3,3 (1st Dep't 1952),
aff'd muem., 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E.2d 84 (1953) (regulation of imports and exports). An
exposition of the nature and types of controls is contained in INTRNATIONAL Mo:imrAnv
FUND, FIRST AN uAL REPORT o. EXCHANGE RESTMricToNs 3-16 (19.FU), and a survey of
restrictions maintained by various countries (including some non-member countries) is
contained in that report and in the second (1951) and third (1952) reports.
129. See, e.g., art. XV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, U.S. Treaty
and Other Int'l Acts Ser., No. 1700 (Dep't State 1949), dealing with restrictions authorized
by the Fund as related to trade problems. See also Dicnv, Co:,i.icr or Lw.s 543 (6th
ed. 1949); Kent Jewelry Corp. v. Kiefer, 119 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
130. According to the Journal of Commerce, Jan. 30, 1952, p. 1, col. 6, the pur-
pose of an OPS amendment to Ceiling Price Reg. 61 was to prevent American exprters
from allowing a foreigner to violate his country's exchange control laws by overpricing
his imports and thus building a dollar fund in the United States.
131. Art. VI, § 3. The section contains the limitation that "no member may cxercke
these controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or which
will unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments, except as provided in
Article VII, Section 3(b), and in Article XIV, Section 2."
132. Art. VII, §3(b). There must be first a formal declaration by the Fund of
scarcity of the currency and consultation with the Fund as to the limitations to be im-
posed.
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ments and transfers for current international transactions" (provided approval
of the Fund is obtained),, 33 of "restrictions on exchange transactions with
non-members or with persons in their territories,"184 and of "restrictions on
payments and transfers for current international transactions"--even though
not approved by the Fund--"during the post-war transitional period.' '
Article VIII, Section 3, makes it clear that transitional period restrictions
are permitted even though discriminatory. In the light of that clear language
and of the Fund's offer to advise whether particular controls are consistent,180
there would be little need for further discussion of the phrase 187 had not
Professor Nussbaum advanced certain arguments which require refutation.
The first of these arguments, that the party interested in invalidation must
prove 138 the "consistency of the regulation invoked with the letter and spirit
of the Agreement,"'139 is predicated on the thought that some regulations
"maintained" (e.g., Czechoslovakian regulations imposed in part by the Hitler
regime) are not "consistent" with the Agreement-that is, consistency means
conformity to the basic purpose of the Agreement. The answer is that the
Agreement sanctions all transitional period regulations, including, for example,
those maintained by the present Czech government, even though they origi-
nated in part with the Hitler regime. That the Fund has not entered into an
examination of a transitional period regulation 1 40 means nothing, for Section
2 of Article XIV is automatic and requires no action by the Fund.
133. Art. VIII, § 2(a).
134. Art. XI, § 2.
135. Art. XIV, § 2. The Fund in its Circular No. 6 (of which Revision 5 was issued
on January 1, 1952) lists the members who have accepted the obligations of art. VIII,
§§ 2, 3, 4, and those who have availed themselves of the transitional arrangements of art.
XIV, § 2.
136. The offer is contained in the Fund interpretation. It extends to "any other as-
pect of Article VIII, Section 2(b)." Such a determination considered as an interpreta-
tion under art. XVIII or as an approval or disapproval of the regulation involved would
be conclusive.
137. Mann's inquiry in The Exchange Control Act, 1947, 10 MoD. L. REv. 411, 419
(1947), whether any inconsistency, no matter how insignificant, would be fatal, does not
present a practical problem. Presumably, however, only the portion of the regulation
sought to be invoked need be shown to be consistent.
138. The use of the word "prove" raises an interesting collateral question. It is, of
course, true that an exchange control regulation as a foreign law must be proved, supra
note 13, but it would seem clear the court may take judicial notice not only of the Fund
Agreement but of the acts and proclamations of the Fund in carrying the Agreement into
effect. United States v. Reynes, 9 How. 127, 147 (U.S. 1850) ; cf. The New York, 175
U.S. 187 (1899). Consequently, it is only necessary that the party interested in invalida-
tion prove the regulation. The determination of "consistency" will then be made by the
court based either on the Fund's determination of the question, or in the absence of such,
on its own interpretation of the Agreement.
139. NussBAum, op. cit. supra note 91, at 543. Cabot, supra note 102, takes the same
position. See Mann, supra note 137, at 412.
140. Consultation by members with the Fund concerning retention of such restrictions
has been required only since March 1, 1952, although the Fund has had power since its
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Finding in Article XX, Section 2(a), a requirement that Article VIII,
Section 2(b), be made part of each member's national law, Professor Xussbaum
reasons that if any country fails to comply, its own regulations are perforce
not consistent with the Agreement: "in other words: the 'consistency' require-
ment implies a reciprocity rule ... .141 We may readily admit there is a re-
quirement that the principle of Article VIII, Section 2(b), be made part of a
member's internal law a' and concede also that there is implicit in the Agree-
ment this principle of reciprocity.143 It does not follow, however, that to
endow the provision with the effect of internal law necessarily requires specific
legislation, M4 nor even that failure to give the provision force under national
law makes the regulation of the defaulting member inconsistent with the
Agreement. The provision requires only that the "exchange control regula-
tions of that member" be consistent; it does not demand consistency in all of
the member's conduct relating to other members' regulations or to other mat-
ters dealt with by the Agreement. The effect of a member's conduct incon-
sistent with the Agreement may be ineligibility to use Fund resources or even
compulsory withdrawal; so long as a country remains a member, however, its
regulations come within the provision if they are permitted under one of the
sections of the Agreement discussed above.
In addition, Professor Nussbaum complains that inclusion of restrictions
"maintained" consistently with the Agreement results in retroactive application
of restrictions.14 We may add that by becoming a member or withdrawing, a
country can retroactively render enforceable or unenforceable contracts which
have previously had the opposite status, and that any new regulation imposed
after the Agreement may make unenforceable a previously existing contract,
and, to this extent, is also retroactive. Legally, there is no objection to such
retroactive application, 46 and practically, retroactivity is essential to the finan-
cial objectives of the controls.
inception to make representations that controls be withdraai. Art. XIV, § 4. Its failure
to act before March 1, 1952, proved nothing; its failure to act since that date may, per-
haps, be considered an implied affirmation of consistency. See N.Y. Herald Tribune, May
28, 1951, p. 5, col. 3, reporting a statement of Fund officials so indicating.
141. NussB.AL , op. cit. supra note 91, at 545.
142. The Fund's interpretation so states.
143. The reciprocal obligation stems rather from art. XX, § 2(a), tian from the ward
"consistently" as used in art. VIII, § 2(b).
144. The only specific legislation required relates to status, immunities, and privileges
of the Fund and its employees, art. IX, § 10. Art. XX, § 2(a), requires only a general
representation. Countries such as the United States and France (Professor Nussbaum to
the contrary notwithstanding: see arts. 26, 28 of the French Constitution), in which treaties
are the law of the land, could properly make that representation without specific legis-
lation. In any event, United States courts would not go behind the representation and
inquire into another country's municipal law. See note 65 supra.
145. Nussmku , op. cit. sapra note 91, at 543.
146. The constitutional question has been referred to in Part II sMpra. As to rctro-
activity in the conflict of laws, compare DicE, otP. cit. supra note 129, at 63s, uirth 1
BrAun, THE Co-,-rTucr op LAws 1 n.1 (1935).
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(7) "Unenforceable"
The Fund interpretation states the meaning of this term as follows:
"1. Parties entering into exchange contracts involving the currency
of any member of the Fund and contrary to exchange control regu-
lations of that member which are maintained or imposed consistently
with the Fund Agreement will not receive the assistance of the judi-
cial or administrative authorities of other members in obtaining the
performance of such contracts. That is to say, the obligations of such
contracts will not be implemented by the judicial or administrative
authorities of member countries, for example, by decreeing perform-
ance of the contracts or by awarding damages for their non-perform-
ance."
This language, and the rejection of the proposed amendment making offend-
ing contracts an "offense" instead of simply "unenforceable, " 147 show that the
latter word as used in the provision involves the familiar concept that the
validity of the contract is unimpaired, but the contract will not be enforced 148
The underlying validity of the contract is of substantial importance, for it
follows from this principle that the only regulations relevant to a particular
case are those in effect at the time enforcement is sought; it is of no interest
that the contract may have been contrary to regulations existing at the time
of its making. It also follows that if a party can enforce a contract by self-
help, he may do so,' 49 and in any action against him may set up the defense
that the contract authorized the self-help action taken.
As the interpretation states, the provision proscribes not only court en-
forcement, but also enforcement by administrative authorities. Moreover,
arbitration, though privately administered, is also barred, because it depends
upon statute and ultimately upon court action for its validation. Only volun-
tary execution or self-help will escape the provision.
The interpretation, however, clouds one point through use of the language,
"Parties entering into exchange contracts ... will not receive ... assist-
ance."1 05 The provision, however, reads "Exchange contracts ... shall be un-
147. Documents 236, 307, supra note 81.
148. Mann, International Monetary Cooperation, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT'l. L. 251, 254
(1945); 1 WILLisToN, CoNTRAcTs § 16 (Rev. ed. 1936); RESTATFiT, CoNTRAcrs § 14
(1932).
149. HowARD, EXCHANGE AND BORROWING CONTROL 254 (1948) states:
"It should be noted that contracts in contravention of any member's Ex-
change Control Regulations are not illegal and void, but merely unenforce-
able. This is important, since, provided a Bank (e.g.) does not have to rely
on the Courts for the purpose of enforcing its rights against a non-resident,
it is not concerned to enquire whether any transaction has been approved in
accordance with the non-resident's currency regulation. Ordinary banking
transactions are therefore quite safe. .... "
150. (Emphasis added.) The second paragraph includes similar language: "[I]f a
party to an exchange contract ... seeks to enforce such a contract...."
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enforceable," wording which makes clear that unenforceability may be urged
in an action not involving the parties. Were this not so, the provision
could easily be circumvented by an assignment or by the making of a contract
for the benefit of a third party, who would then be free to enforce it. Since
the phrasing of the interpretation appears inadvertent, it is not to be expected
that the courts will limit Article VIII, Section 2(b), to actions between the
parties to the contract.
Since unenforceability is a negative concept, it follows that no member need
take any positive action to police or enforce another's regulation.Y' So, for
example, there is no obligation on a member to procure payment to another
member of funds in the former's territory which the latter's regulations pur-
port to vest l-even though the same regulations render unenforceable the
contract under which the funds are held. Likewise, a contract consistent with
the regulations of member A, whose currency is involved, need not be enforced
by member B if inconsistent with B's regulation, for the obligation relates only
to unenforceability.
(8) "Territories"53
Little need be said concerning the meaning of this word, other than that
Article XX, Section 2(g), makes clear that it includes not only members'
metropolitan territories but also "all their colonies, overseas territories, all
territories under their protection, suzerainty, or authority and all territories
in respect of which they exercise a mandate."
(C) Effect of the Provision
Having thus delimited the meaning of the first sentence of Article VIII,
Section 2(b), we turn to a consideration of its effect. One important limita-
tion, stemming from Article VIII, Section 6, and Article VII, Section 5, con-
cerns engagements between members which were entered into prior to the
Agreement and which conflict with the application of exchange restrictions
authorized by the Agreement. Except with respect to restrictions imposed under
the scarce currency provision, the Agreement does not override such conflict-
ing engagements, unless the members agree otherwise. Another limitation is
the rule of treaty construction under which an earlier treaty (in this case,
the Agreement) may be affected by a later treaty, even though some of the
parties to the first agreement did not participate in the second.1 "
151. NussRAum, op. cit. supra note 91, at 545; see Kahler v. M6idland Bank, Ltd.,
[1949] 2 All E.R. 621, 634 (H.L.) (dissenting opinion). The second sentence of art.
VIII, § 2(b), authorizes agreements to that end, however.
152. See Solicitor for the Affairs of His Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co.,
304 N.Y. 282, 107 N.E.2d 44S (1952), which involved the procedural aspects of such a
case.
153. It does not appear significant that the first and second versions of the provision
used the singular "territory."
154. TOBIN, TERMIUxATION OF MuLTi. nrI Tnm.xTLEs 206 et seq. (1933); Harvard
Research in International Law, Draft Commation on the Law of Trcatics, 29 A.L J. INrzi.
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However, where no earlier or later limiting agreement exists, the effect of
Article VIII, Section 2(b), is far-reaching. The purpose of the provision is
the international recognition of such controls as the Agreement sanctions.156
To accomplish that purpose required limitation not only of the public policy
doctrine (often destructively applied 156), but also of such right as a country
has under private international law to select its own theories of conflict of
laws. 157 The Fund interpretation announces the achievement of that purpose
in the following language:
"An obvious result of the foregoing undertaking is that if a party
to an exchange contract of the kind referred to in Article VIII,
Section 2(b) seeks to enforce such a contract, the tribunal of the
member country before which the proceedings are brought will not,
on the ground that they are contrary to the public policy (ordre
public) of the forum, refuse recognition of the exchange control regu-
lations of the other member which are maintained or imposed con-
sistently with the Fund Agreement. It also follows that such con-
tracts will be treated as unenforceable notwithstanding that tinder
the private international law of the forum, the law under which the
foreign exchange control regulations are maintained or imposed is
not the law which governs the exchange contract or its perform-
ance."
l58
Since more than one currency may be involved, a contract will be unenforce-
able if contrary to the regulation of any member affected; only if the con-
tract remains enforceable under all such laws may the court return to a con-
sideration of its own private international law. Thus the Agreement has now
superimposed 159 the law of the currency on the pre-existing rules.
L. 1016 et seq. (Supp. 1935). See also id. at 1009 et seq.; and Its re Ross, 140 U.S. 453
(1891). The United States-United Kingdom Agreement of December 6, 1945, U.S.
TREATIS AND OTHER INT'L Acts SEr., No. 1545 (Dept. State 1945), under which the re-
spective governments agreed not to continue, after one year, to invoke the transitional
period provisions of the Agreement unless after consultation they agreed otherwise, is
such an agreement.
155. See Kraus v. Zivnostenska Banka, 187 Misc. 681, 685, 64 N.Y.S.2d 208, 211 (Sup.
Ct. 1946); Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank, [1948] 1 ICB. 730, 746, rev'd,
[1949] 1 K.B. 199 (C.A. 1948), refd sub nor. Zivnostenska Banka Nat. Corp. v. Frank-
man, [1950] A.C. 57 (1949).
156. Note, 47 YALE L.J. 292 (1938) : "Since the substance of public policy has seldom
been defined, it has been recognized that unless checked it may be applied destructively to
interfere with the normal play of private international law." See also NuSSBAUM, op. Cit.
supra note 91, at 544.
157. See Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951).
158. Accord, HowARD, op. cit. supra note 149; see also DicEm, op. cit. supra note 129,
at 752. Contra: Lord MacDermotts dissent in Kahler v. Midland Bank, Ltd., [1949] 2
All E.R. 621, 629 (H.L.) ; see also NussBAuM, op. cit. vepa note 91, at 544; ScgIFuF-
HOFF, A TEXTBOOK OF THE ENGLISH COxFLICT OF LAWs 122 (1948); Note, 26 Bar. Y.B.
IxT'L L. 487 (1949).
159. Mann, in articles, supra note 111, speaks of the substitution of lex vionetac for
lex causae. The word "superimposed" is believed more apt.
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This is the clear effect of the provision. Yet courts and writers who have
long relied on policy arguments in exchange control matters and who are
perhaps confused by apparent contradiction between the unenforceability pro-
vision and the inclusion as an ultimate Agreement objective of the "elimina-
tion of restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade," have been re-
luctant to accord the provision full effect3 c0  The short answer-at least in
countries (such as the United States and France) where a treaty is the law
of the land, and presumably in countries (such as England) where the quality
of internal law has been specifically conferred on Article VIII, Section 2(b)-
is that where the provision applies, the courts may no longer consider policy.
The policy of all members is now determined by or under the Fund Agree-
ment. It is determined by the Agreement in the case of capital transfer re-
strictions and transitional period restrictions which, even though discrimina-
tory, will be enforced. It is determined under the Agreement in the case of
non-transitional restrictions on current transactions, which, through the Fund's
power of approval or disapproval, are subject to determination of policy by
the Fund rather than any court. Acceptance of these policy determinations
and cession of the approval function have been ratified by each member's
policy-maling body-its government-after full consideration of all of the
policy problems involved. 1' Each government has thus accepted the Fund-
with its power to impose sanctions upon any member which enforces tin-
approved current restrictions or retains transitional restrictions after the Fund
directs their withdrawal-as the arbiter of policy and of the penalties to be
exacted for violation of policy. And the judiciary must always follow such
legislative determinations of policy. There is, therefore, no longer any basis
for the courts to consider the question. Given only consistency with the Agree-
ment, no distinction can be drawn among various controls.
IV. CASES CONCERNING MEMBER NATIONS DECIDED SINCE THE
AGREEMENT
Of the nineteen cases concerned with exchange controls of a member coun-
try decided in the seven years that the International Monetary Fund Agree-
160. See NussBAUMr, op. cit. supra note 91, particularly at 542-3. Dsc-v, op. cit. svpra
note 129, suggests that as to property situated in England the law uf the situs may still
override foreign controls (Contra: Note, 93 SoL. J. 749 (1949)), and that a court may be
faced with the dilemma of choosing between the policy condemning confiscatory controls
and the policy to observe treaty obligations. The courts, as we shall see in Part IV infra,
have been slow to consider the Agreement.
161. During the debate on H.R. 3314, it ras argued that while the Agreement pur-
ported to eliminate restrictions, it actually fostered them by permitting them to remain
in effect for an indefinite period at the discretion of the Fund Governors. Senator Taft
proposed an amendment prohibiting any country from drawing on the Fund until it had
removed all restrictions, 91 CoxG. Rac. 7753 (1945), and Senator Ball proposcd an amend-
ment directing the United States Governors to request an amendment to the Agreement
to this end, id. at 7776. Both amendments were defeated. Id. at 7774, 7779.
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ment has been in effect, 162 the majority simply make no reference to it.103 Of
those cases in which an argument based on the Agreement was presented,
some reached conclusions consistent with it,104 but prior to the Court of
162. There may, of course, also be other cases in the courts of countries the reports
of which are not readily available. Freund v. Laenderbank Wien Aktiengesellschaft.
277 App. Div. 770, 97 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1st Dep't 1950), is not included, although at the
time of the decision Austria had been a Fund member for two years, because the case
was concerned with German regulations applicable to Austria.
163. Two cases reach results at variance with the Agreement. All the other decisions
which do not mention the Agreement reach results consistent with it: Industrial Export
& Import Corp. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 302 N.Y. 342, 98 N.E.2d 466
(1951), upheld a Chinese regulation against public policy arguments, noting that the Ex-
change Stabilization Board was "apparently created under a plan formulated by the
Governments of United States, Great Britain and China." Id. at 346, 98 N.E.2d at 468.
Matter of Maria Liebl, 201 Misc. 1092, 106 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Surr. Ct. 1951), and Matter
of Theresie Liebl, 201 Misc. 1102, 106 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Surr. Ct. 1951), are discussed in
the text below. In re De Montale's Estate, 199 Misc. 711, 107 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Surr. Ct.
1950), and Perkins v. DeWitt, 197 Misc. 369, 94 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1950) held that,
as a matter of construction of the control invoked, the control was not applicable.
In re De Gheest's Estate, 362 Mo. 634, 243 S.W.2d 83 (1951), held enforceable an agree-
ment to be performed in Missouri but which had been made in Occupied France without the
license required by regulations (whether French or German does not appear) there In
force. Sakin v. London-New York-Shanghai Trading Corp., 125 N.Y.L.J. 1086, col. 6
(Sup. Ct. Mar. 26, 1951), vacated an attachment on the ground that a transfer to Eng-
land under compulsion of British controls resulted from force inajcure and was not fraud-
ulent; Marcu v. Fischer, 65 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1946), held a defense based on Bel-
gian regulations insufficient where the securities involved were here and their owner had
not been domiciled in Belgium; the Vienna Court of Appeals, in a case decided June 29,
1949, reported in 77 JOURNAL DU DRoIT INTERNATIONAL 741 (France 1950), and In
Oesterr. Juristenzeitung Ev. Bl., 1949, No. 564, held that British controls would not ex-
cuse an English plaintiff from furnishing security for costs.
Of the two inconsistent cases, Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App.
Div. 417, 422, 110 N.Y.S.2d 383, 387 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd ,win., 304 N.Y. 942, 110
N.E.2d 884 (1953), which involved the currency of twelve countries, eight of which
were Fund members, stated that "[n]o illegality that we can recognize is likely to be
involved in the transfer in New York of the title to foreign balances which remain In
the foreign countries." This dictum is, in the light of the Agreement, clearly too broad,
and in view of the Perutz decision, infra note 165, apparently will not be followed. The
other, Ahmed Bey Naguib v. Heirs of Moise, Mixed Ct. Alexandria, Nov. 24/25, 1948,
J.T.M. No. 4003, refused to apply Italian restrictions where an insurance contract made
in Cairo called for payment in lire by check on an Italian bank, holding that thils meant
a check negotiable in Cairo.
164. Jacobson v. Warzyski, 275 App. Div. 795, 88 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1st Dep't 1949),
action on a deposit brought without Polish license, summary judgment for defendant
properly granted "in the absence of opposition"; Cermak v. Bata Akclova Spoleenost, 80
N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd niem., 275 App. Div. 1030, 91 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1st
Dep't 1949), the court finding as a fact that defendant had the license required by Czech
regulations. Zivnostenska Banka Nat. Corp. v. Frankman, [1950] A.C. 57 (1949) ; Kahler
v. Midland Bank, Ltd., [1949] 2 All E.R. 621 (H.L.); and Catz & Lips v. S.A. Union
Versicherung, Tribunal Civil D'Anvers, Belgium, Jan. 21, 1949, 7 & 8 JuasIuuncu
DU PORT D'ANvEns 321, are discussed in the text below.
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Appeals decision in the Perutz case, 1 65 only two decisions may be said to have
relied upon the Agreement.' 60 The language of the three cases last referred
to, as well as the reference in Peritz to two other cases where the Agreement
was argued (Kahler 167 and Frankman 16s), makes clear that these decisions
resulted from the application of conflicts criteria, rather than from the accept-
ance by the courts of the Agreement as a "superimposed" rule of decision.
For the purposes of these decisions, nothing more was required. Eventually,
however, the courts will be faced with the case in which conflicts norms pro-
duce results divergent from the Agreement. Since the earlier decisions will
have important bearing on the conclusion reached in such a case, a review of
their passage through the courts appears in order.
In the Perutz case, plaintiff was the administratrix of a former employee of
a Czechoslovaldan bank (the predecessor of defendant); the employee had
come to the United States in 1940 and died in 1949. Under an agreement
with the bank, he was entitled to a pension commencing in 1940, and under
a consent judgment had obtained all sums due him under the contract up to
October 31, 1942. The present action, begun by attachment, was for the sums
accruing after that date. While conceding the sums to be due under the con-
tract, and in fact having deposited them in plaintiff's name in a blocked ac-
count in Czechoslovakia, defendant set up the lack of a license under Czech
regulations as a defense to the action. The lower court, noting that the con-
tract provided for payment in Czech crowns at defendant's place of business
in Czechoslovalda, held that defendant had by its deposit fully performed, and
dismissed the complaint.'0 9 On appeal plaintiff argued that the Czech regula-
tions under the present political situation were confiscatory, that they were
penal and fiscal and therefore should not be enforced, and that since judgment
could be had in Czechoslovakia, judgment should also be granted here. De-
fendant responded that Czech law was applicable unless it offended public
policy; that there was no question of public policy here in view of the Bretton
Woods Agreement Act and of Article VIII, Section 2(b), and other pro-
visions of the Agreement; that the Agreement is a binding international
agreement; that the court cannot attempt to make recognition dependent on
the political situation of the moment ;170 and that the fact that plaintiff could
165. Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.Ed
6 (1953).
166. Kraus v. Zivnostenska Banka, 187 Misc. 6S1, 64 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1946),
applying a Czech regulation, noted that the Fund Agreement provided for such recogni-
tion; Spitz v. Schlesische Kredit Anstalt, 119 N.Y.L.J. 267, coL 6 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 20,
1948), on the authority of the Kraus case, applied a Polish regulation.
167. Kahler v. Midland Bank, Ltd., [1949] 2 All E.R. 621 (H.L.).
168. Zivnostenska Banka Nat. Corp. v. Frank-man, [1950] A.C 57 (1949).
169. Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 125 N.Y.L.J. 440, col. 4
(Sup. Ct Feb. 2, 1951).
170. The basis for the argument was that Czech controls had existed for twenty-five
years and included those of the pre-war regime, the Nazi occupation, and the post-war
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get judgment in Czechoslovakia did not mean that she had a cause of action
here. The Appellate Division, however, without reference to the Agreement,
reversed, holding that since the expert testimony was that plaintiff could get
judgment in Czechoslovakia, and since the court had jurisdiction of the matter,
judgment could be obtained here. 1 It further held (two judges dissenting
on this point) that satisfaction of a judgment obtained here out of assets
attached here would not necessitate transmission of funds from Czechoslovakia
and that the absence of a Czech license did not necessitate a stay of execution.
The majority explained the grant of a stay would "give unwarranted extra-
territorial effect to foreign law and enforce it beyond its terms,"" 2 since the
money had its situs here and since Czech controls could have no control over
a levy on such funds, nor over the enforcement of process by the courts of New
York. The Court of Appeals,173 reversing the Appellate Division, adopted, in
part, the defendant's line of argument. It referred to the Agreement only to
establish that because of it and the membership of the United States and
Czechoslovakia in the Fund, Czech regulations could not be considered con-
trary to public policy.
The Frankman case, an English proceeding, involved sterling debentures
issued by a Czechoslovakian corporation in London. Certain of those deben-
tures, held by the London branch of defendant bank, became the property of
Mrs. Frankman, a Czech citizen. Thereafter Mrs. Frankman came to Eng-
land, where she died. Her personal representative claimed re-delivery of the
debentures, a claim opposed by the bank because the consent required tinder
Czech controls had been refused. The court of first instance held the place of
performance and contracting to be Czechoslovakia; it countered the argument
that the Czech exchange controls were penal and revenue acts with the state-
ment that "[t]he Bretton Woods Agreement shows that such restrictions are
honoured by the members of the International Monetary Fund"; in support,
Article VIII, Section 2(b), was quoted.17 4 The Court of Appeals reversed,
making no reference to the Agreement, holding that English law was intended
by the parties to govern."75 The House of Lords reversed the Court of
Appeals; its five opinions were concerned primarily with showing that the
terms of the contract between the parties made Prague the place of contract-
ing and of performance.'" Only one opinion referred to the Agreement and
that only on the penal and confiscatory law point.1'
Communist government. The argument, in the absence of a binding federal determiina-
tion of policy, is fallacious. See Part V infra.
171. Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 279 App. Div. 386, 110
N.Y.S.2d 446 (1st Dep't 1952).
172. Id. at 392, 110 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
173. 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953).
174. Zivnostenska Banka Nat. Corp. v. Frankman, [1948] 1 K.B. 730, 746.
175. [1949] 1 K.B. 199 (C.A. 1948).
176. [1950] A.C. 57 (1949).
177. Id. at 72. See Mann, Money in Public International Law, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT L L.
259, 281-2 (1949).
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Another English case, Kahler v. Midland Bank, Ltd.. 7l3 involved negotiable
shares in a Canadian company originally purchased by plaintiff in London.
In 193S, while plaintiff was a Czechoslovakian national resident in Prague,
he transferred custody of the shares to a Czech bank, of which he had become
a customer. The Czech bank continued to hold the certificate in London in
its dossier with defendant, an English bank. Plaintiff left Czechoslovakia in
1939 and brought action both in contract and in detinue for the certificate.
The defendant bank answered to the first that there was no privity and to the
second that plaintiff was not entitled to immediate possession, the consent
required under Czech exchange regulations having been refused. The court of
first instance held for plaintiff, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which
upheld both of defendant's contentions. 79 The only reference to the Agree-
ment, however, was the statement that an interesting argument, turning largely
on the interpretation of the term "exchange contract" in Article VIII, Section
2(b), had been made, but that in view of the decision reached it was not
necessary to express a view on the argument. The House of Lords affirmed
the Court of Appeals by a three to two vote. The majority stated that plain-
tiff's right to immediate possession depended upon his contract with the
Czechoslovakian bank, and since the contract was subject to Czech law and
consent under that law had been withheld, plaintiff could not compel delivery
of the shares to himself. The argument concerning the Fund Agreement
apparently was not so clearly put in the House of Lords as it had been below,
with the result that the only reference to the Agreement is a statement in one
of the dissents rejecting the argument',
Each of the three cases involved an "exchange contract" :181 Kahler and
Frankman, because the transactions, under plaintiffs' constructions, would
have permitted a Czech national who had deposited securities abroad to have
them delivered in the foreign country either to himself or another; Perutz,
because the pension agreement was a deliberate contractual arrangement, en-
forcement of which was sought in dollars rather than kronen. In each, there-
fore, the Agreement pointed the way without reference to conflicts prin-
ciples.' 82 The failure to adopt-or spell out more clearly-the line of reason-
ing based on Article VIII, Section 2(b), of the Agreement as the supreme
law Is3 can only be productive of future confusion.
178. [1949] 2 All E.R 621 (H.L.).
179. [1948] 1 All E.R. 811 (C.A.).
180. [1949] 2 All E.R. 621, 633-4 (H.L.).
181. The point was argued in Pcrut: on an earlier m.tion to vacate the attachment,
but, strangely, on the motion for judgment dismissing the complaint was only incidentally
referred to in the briefs. This, perhaps, explains the cryptic decision rendered.
1812. See Note, 26 BarT. Y.B. INTL L. 487 (1949). Mann, supra note 177, suggests
as a further ground for the Kahler and Frankman decisions the duty of the court to refuse
to effectuate a claim, recognition of which would amount to a breach of art. 5 of the
Monetary Agreement between Britain and Czechoslovakia.
183. While there is no British constitutional provision corresponding to ours, the
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The two Liebl cases furnish apt examples of this potential difficulty. Matter
of Maria Liebl,18 4 relying on conflicts principles and construction of the Czech
regulation, held that lack of a Czech license could not affect the Public Ad-
ministrator's right to a bank book covering a New York account of a United
States resident who died while in Czechoslovakia. Matter of Theresie Liebl,185
relying on the policy to protect domestic distributees and the policy against
confiscatory fiscal laws, held that lack of a Czech license could not affect the
Public Administrator's right to a bank book covering a New York account of
a Czech resident who became entitled, before her death, to a Totten trust ac-
count because she had survived the trustee. In neither case was the Agree-
ment applicable: Maria Liebl did not involve Czech currency or other exchange
assets; Theresie Liebl concerned the right of inheritance of distributees rather
than enforceability of a contract. And in both cases, the bank, in urging the
Czech regulations to prevent administration of assets located here, was assert-
ing a positive claim beyond the unenforceability concept of Article VIII, Sec-
tion 2(b): Yet despite the provision's patent inapplicability, the less than
precise language of the Perutz decision could induce an erroneous reliance
upon the Agreement in the Liebl situations. For if the meaning of the Pcrutto
decision is that the policy concepts on which Theresie Liebl is based may not
be urged because the United States and Czechoslovakia are members of the
Fund, the Agreement will be given effect beyond its own express provision.
The illogic of that result supplies the gap in the reasoning of the decision.
Only one other case involving Fund members requires discussion. In Cato
& Lips v. S. A. Union Versicherung,8 6 a Belgian court reached a correct re-
sult on reasoning which, however, overlooked Article VIII, Section 2(b), and
confused several other provisions of the Agreement. The action was an attach-
ment of funds in Belgium brought by a Dutch claimant against a Czechoslo-
vakian insurance company. The defendant invoked the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment and the Dutch-Czechoslovak convention of November 15, 1946, entered
into pursuant to the Agreement, which prohibited the transfer of funds from
one country to another whenever the payment was for a debt incurred prior
to December 20, 1945. The court held that the action must be rejected,
basing the result on the following confused and circuitous reasoning: Article
VI of the Agreement permits the control of capital movements and Article
XIV, Section 2, further extends this permission with regard to occupied
countries; neither the Agreement nor the convention concluded thereunder
prohibit an attachment in the creditor's country since this cannot involve a
Schedule to the Order in Council (S.R. & 0., 1946, No. 36) relating to the Bretton
Woods Agreements -gives full force and effect to art. VIII, §2(b).
184. 201 Misc. 1092, 106 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Surr. Ct. 1951). In both this case and the
other Liebl case, infra note 185, the Kahler case was extensively analyzed; in neither was
the Agreement mentioned.
185. 201 Misc. 1102, 106 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
186. Tribunal Civil D'Anvers, Belgium, Jan. 21, 1949, 7 & 8 JuIUsPRunz.cE DU Por
D'AxvEas 321.
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capital transfer; the purpose of the Bretton Woods Agreement was not to
prevent a debtor from paying his debts, but to allow countries the possibility
of prohibiting certain modes of payment, namely capital transfers; the 1946
Dutch-Czechoslovak convention prevents the Czechoslovakian debtor from
paying in Holland, where it has no funds; this does not prevent plaintiff from
taling protective steps to obtain payment, but attachment is not a protective
but a compulsory measure whereby plaintiffs seek to obtain indirectly what
the convention prevents them from obtaining and their debtor from giving;
this is therefore contradictory to the laws of the three countries involved and
the claim cannot be enforced. The court thus based its decision on the sole
ground that Belgium, recognizing a convention entered into by two other
members under the Agreement, ' 8 7 wll not enforce what such a convention
prohibits. It ignored or avoided the equally clear ground that the insurance
claim constituted an exchange contract under Article VIII, Section 2(b),
payment of which would contravene the regulations of Czechoslovada, a mem-
ber country, and which therefore could not be enforced, through attachment or
otherwise, in Belgium. In so doing, the court unnecessarily and erroneously
classified the payment of an insurance claim as a capital transfer, whereas
such a payment seems clearly "due in connection with foreign trade, other
current business, including services,"' 88 and took an unnecessarily strict view
of what a capital transfer involved. In the light of Perubt and the language
of the Agreement itself, it is not expected that the decision will be given much
weight by United States courts.
V. CASES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE AGREEM1ENT
That a particular situation falls outside the scope of the Agreement does
not necessarily mean that conflict of laws principles remain unchanged, for
other international agreements or laws affect the situation. Thus, the Special
Exchange Agreement between Indonesia and the Contracting Parties of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 180 contains a clause which is
an adaptation of Article VIII, Section 2(b), of the Fund Agreement. except
that it is unilateral; it provides for unenforceability only "in the territories of In-
donesia." Yet an Indonesian control permitted under the Special Exchange
Agreement would deserve recognition from the Contracting Parties. Since
the United States is indirectly a party to that agreement, it is reasonable to
suppose that it will be possible to obtain from the State Department a sug-
gestion that federal policy requires recognition of such a control. So also the
peace treaty provision subjecting compensation payments to foreign exchange
187. The report states that a similar convention exists between Belgium and Czecho-
slovakia, a fact which may have influenced the Belgian court.
188. Agreement, art. XLX(i).
189. October 20, 1950 (published by the United Nations). Similar agreements with
Ceylon and Haiti automatically expired when those countries became members of the
Fund.
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controls 190 will work a change in pre-existing law in the cases to which it
specifically applies, and a military government law promulgated by United
States authorities will be given effect as an expression of federal policy.
10
'
However, for a variety of reasons, the Fund Agreement cannot be used as
the basis for requiring, under a most-favored-nation arrangement, a member
nation to apply a non-member's controls.'9 2
In the absence of an applicable treaty provision, it is nonetheless argued
that the recognition of exchange controls by the Fund Agreement, the peace
treaties, and GATT,193 and the change in extent to which and purpose for
which such restrictions were invoked after World War II indicate a change
of conditions sufficient to work a reversal of the former public policy rule.
194
Insofar as the argument is based on the Fund Agreement, it overlooks the
fact that Agreement provisions extend international recognition only to con-
trols of those countries which through membership in the Fund have accepted
the principles of cooperation, limitation, and supervision set forth in the
Agreement, and that, although "parallel stipulations for dealing with non-
member countries" were requested, 195 they are not to be found in the Agree-
190. Contained in the treaties with Italy, art. 78(4) (c); Rumania, art. 24(4) (c);
Bulgaria, art. 23(4) (c); Hungary, art. 26(4) (c), U.S. Treaties and Other Int'l Acts
Ser., Nos. 1648-51 (Dep't State 1947) ; as well as in the Memorandum of Understanding
between the United States and Italy, § 16(d), U.S. Treaties and Other Int'l Acts Ser.,
No. 1757 (Dep't State 1948).
191. Matter of Muller, 199 Misc. 745, 104 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Kent
Jewelry Corp. v. Kiefer, 119 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1952); it re Habekost's Estate,
118 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
192. The rule ejusdem generis will exclude most clauses. SNYDER, THE MOST-
FAvoRED-NATIoN CLAUSE 39-40, 93, 140, 224 (1948) ; cf. art. XVII, Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Ireland, U.S. Treaty and Other Int'l Acts Ser., No. 2155
(Dep't State 1950). If not, there remain the problems whether or not unenforceability
may be termed a "favor," 6 0Ps. Arr'y GEN. 148, 151 (1853) ; whether or not the clause
may be enforced by an individual in private litigation, George E. Warren Corp. v. United
States, 94 F.2d 597, 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 572 (1938); whether or
not it is necessary to show reciprocity on the part of the other nation, 1 HAeXWORTn,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAIw 274 (1943); Sayre, The Most-Favored-Natlion Polly
in Relatim to Trade Agreements, 33 Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 411, 418 (1939) ; and whether
the fact that the Fund Agreement is a multi-partite convention to which non-members
can become parties prevents the application of the clause, 2 HACKWORTIX, Op,. Cit. supra,
at 293; SNYDER, op. cit. supra, at 167.
193. U.S. TREATY AND OrER INTL ACTS SE%, No. 1700 (Dept. State 1947), particular-
ly arts. XIV(5), XV. The Charter of the International Trade Organization also is some-
times referred to, but it is not considered herein because it presumably will not be ratified
by the United States. Dep't of State Press Release, No. 1221, Dec. 6, 1950.
194. See Strauss & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 412, 173 NE. 564, 566
(1930); 72 C.J.S. 218 (1951); 5 WILsLoN, CoNrAcTs 4556 (Rev. ed. 1937). See
Friedmann, Foreigi Exchange Control in American Courts, 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 97,
115 (1951).
195. Document 374, PROcEEDINGS AND DOcuMENTs OF THE UNITED NAToNs MONE-
TARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE, PUBLICATON No. 2866, INT'L ORG. AND CONF. SEa.
1, No. 3, p. 605 (U.S. Dep't State 1948).
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ment."0 6 Since the Agreement supersedes prior policy only because it is an
executive agreement, 197 the deliberate limitation of its provisions negates the
extreme conclusions sought to be drawn from it. Likewise, the limited recog-
nition accorded controls by the peace treaties and by the GATT provisions
for restrictions consistent with the Fund Agreement does not yield any more
substantial implication. Moreover, the contention that exchange controls are
now in more general use is, it appears, subject to question.103 Nor is the
statement that present day controls rest on economic rather than political
principles a sound generalization. True, in many cases exchange restrictions
are necessary to economic survival,100 and conceivably the interests of the
United States may require recognition of a non-member country's controls
as a means of protecting its balance of payments. - w Yet it is also true that
the existing "cold war" has in the case of some of the Soviet-Bloc nations
returned the situation to that which existed before World War II, when
regulations acceptable on paper were administered for hostile purposes.20
Thus, after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the same regulations
previously regarded as not confiscatory 202 were held, in Matter of Theresie
Liebl,20 3 to produce a confiscatory result. Another New York case, Plsch v.
196. Though art. XI of the Agreement specifically excepts "the right of any member
to impose restrictions on exchange transactions with non-members or with persons in
their territories."
197. Bollack v. Societe Generale Pour Favoriser, etc., 263 App. Div. 601, 33 N.Y.S2d
986, leave to appeal denied, 264 App. Div. 767, 35 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1st Dep't 1942) (refus-
ing to apply United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), on the ground that the latter
case had been based on an executive agreement). See also Anderson v. N.V. Transandine
Handelnaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 20, 32 N.E.2d 502, 507 (1942); and Mann, Money in
Public International Law, 26 BmrT. Y.B. Im-r' L. 259, 279 (1949).
198. For a comparison of the use of controls before and after World War II, see
S=rm, THE UN rm STATES IN' INTERNATIONAL BANKING (1951), particularly pp. 29 and
378, and INTERxATioNAL MONETAnY Fuxn, FIRsT ANNUAL PI'ORT ON FxcrruxCn RE-
snucrioNs (1950), both of which indicate that pre-World War II use of controls was
widespread.
199. See Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 421, 110
N.Y.S.2d 383, 386-7 (lst Dep't 1952), aff'd mem., 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E.2d EM4 (19.53),
where the court stated:
"[It would be impractical as well as unjust to stay executions upon judg-
ments until the removal of currency restrictions by foreign governments,
which, in the foreseeable future, they cannot accomplish in many cases ex-
cept at the expense of national survival"
200. Dicr, CoNFLicrs oF LAw 751 (6th ed. 1949). See Industrial Export & Imp!rt
Corp. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 302 N.Y. 342, 93 N.E.2d 466 (1951).
201. Bronz, The International Trade Orgam:iation Charter, 62 HAnv. L REv. 10S9,
1098 (1949).
202. Werfel v. Zivnostenska Banka, 260 App. Div. 747, 23 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1st Dep't
1940), rev'd on other grounds, 287 N.Y. 91, 38 N.E.2d 3R2 (1941). The Kahlcr and
Frankman cases reached the same result.
203. 201 Mlisc. 1102, 106 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
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Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti,2°4 was decided on the ground that
there was no showing that the Haitian decrees involved were not confiscatory
and that it could not be assumed they were valid. Such cases, as well as the
use of Section 269 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act to withhold pay-
ment of legacies to persons in various Soviet-Bloc countries, 20 5 and the decision
in A/S Merilaid & Co. v. Chase National Bank of New York 00 (holding that
an Estonian decree made after the incorporation of that country into the
U.S.S.R. was confiscatory) indicate that the courts are not likely to accept
the factual basis of the contention that public policy has been reversed, in the
face of hostile political interests. Other evidence, in fact, indicates that politi-
cal considerations are of more importance than deductive reasoning based on
factual niceties: the failure of the courts to distinguish between normal con-
trols and regulations which are truly confiscatory, 20 7 and the implication aris-
ing from decisions rendered without discussion of the argument that controls
which had been in effect since 1931 could not be regarded as confiscatory.2 " 1
It is not surprising, therefore, to find the court which in Peratz held the Fund
Agreement to have worked a reversal of public policy, not accepting the con-
204. 273 App. Div. 224, 77 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1st Dep't), aff'd per curiam, 298 N.Y.
573, 81 N.E.2d 106 (1948).
205. Hungary: Matter of Braier, 108 N.Y.S.2d 417 (Surr. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App.
Div. 1008, 113 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 148, 111 NE.2d 424
(1953) ; Estate of Theresa Grisbako, 127 N.Y.LJ. 958, col. 2 (Surr. Ct. Mar. 7, 1952) ;
Matter of Anna Kudlich, 127 N.Y.L.J. 51, col. 2 (Surr. Ct. Jan. 3, 1952); In re
Getream's Estate, 200 Misc. 543, 107 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Surr. Ct. 1951). China: Matter
of Wong Hoen, 199 Misc. 1119, 107 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Matter of Yee
Yoke Ban, 200 Misc. 499, 107 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Surr. Ct. 1951). Russia: Matter of Best,
200 Misc. 332, 107 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Surr. Ct. 1951). The Russian Zone of Germany:
Matter of Thomae, 199 Misc. 940, 105 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ; Matter of Max
Perlinsky, 128 N.Y.L.J. 76, col. 7 (Surr. Ct. July 11, 1952). Lithuania: In re Geffen's
Estate, 199 Misc. 756, 104 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Surr. Ct. 1951). See also N.Y. CIV. PRAc. Acr
§§ 474, 978; and In re Uri, 7 N.J. Super. 455, 71 A.2d 655 (1951), appeal dismissed, 5
N.J. 507, 76 A.2d 249 (1950). While these cases are concerned with our control of for-
eign assets, they are nonetheless important indications of state policy. As indicated in
note 63 supra, they are based in part on related federal policy.
206. 189 Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
207. Sulyok v. Penzintezeti Kozpont Budapest, 279 App. Div. 528, 111 N.Y.S.2d 75
(1st Dep't), aff'd as nwdified, 304 N.Y. 704, 107 N.E.2d 604 (1952), involved (1)
a decree which prohibited payment of pensions to persons who had departed from Hungary
for more than three months and (2) Hungarian exchange controls which had been in
effect since 1931. The court correctly held the decree to be confiscatory and simply
ignored the argument based on the exchange controls.
208. See Sulyok v. Penzintezeti Kozpont Budapest, supra note 207; Stern v. Pesti
Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank, 303 N.Y. 881, 105 N.E.2d 106 (1952), itnm. affrmning 278
App. Div. 811, 105 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1st Dep't 1951), mere. reversing 123 N.Y.L.J. 1281,
col. 3 (Sup. Ct. April 12, 1950) (trial court applied Hungarian exchange control);
Freund v. Laenderbank Wien Aktiengesellschaft, 277 App. Div. 770, 97 N.Y.S,2d 549
(1st Dep't 1950) (concerned with German controls in effect in Austria).
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tention that a change in public policy had occurred with respect to Hungarian
regulations. 209
It cannot, however, be safely assumed that a different attitude will prevail
with respect to countries outside the Soviet-Bloc. Dutch-American Mercantile
Corporation v. Frank & Moloney, Inc.,210 involved a sale of Spanish peseta.
Defendant contended that the sale was invalid under Spanish law and that as
a matter of public policy our courts will not enforce a contract which, though
made here, calls for performance of an act illegal under the la, of the place
of performance. The court held the contract valid under the law of New
York, where it was made, and the Spanish law not pertinent. Hughes Tool
Company v. United Artists Corporation,2 11 which was a rate of exchange case
involving the currencies of Argentina, Burma, Palestine, and South Africa,
among others, contains a dictum that "[n]o illegality that we can recognize
is likely to be involved in the transfer in New York of title to foreign balances
which remain in the foreign countries."21-' And, while the Industrial Export
& Import Corporation case 2 1 3 evidences a more tolerant approach to ex-
change controls, the court in its decision carefully noted the participation of
the United States in the establishment of the Stabilization Board, whose regu-
lations were in question.
CONCLUSIONS
Prior to the International Monetary Fund Agreement, there were few
situations in which it could be said with certainty that an exchange control
regulation would be applied. A restriction of the forum was given effect,
except, perhaps, where forum was the sole point of contract. In other cases,
however, application hinged on what law was found to govern and what the
public policy of the forum was found to be. The first inquiry revolved around
the intention of the parties, and, in the absence of a clear indication of intent,
209. In the Stern case, supra note 208, and the Slvok case, supra note 207, in both @'f
which the point was fully briefed and argued. The same conclusion was reached by a
Dutch court in a case reported in Netherlands jurisprudence, 1948, Nlo. 130, and noted
in Saher, A Dutch Judgment Concerning Hungarian Forcign Exchange Regulatio:s, 3
INT'L LQ. 102 (1950). So also there is consistency between Jacobson v. Warzycki, 275
App. Div. 795, 88 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1st Dep't 1949), involving Poland at a time when she
was a Fund member and in which the decision was in favor of the proponent of the
argument, and Kaufman v. Miedzynarodowy Bank Handlowvy S.A., 126 N.Y.LJ. 55, col
4 (Sup. Ct July 9, 1951), decided after Poland withdrew from the Fund and in which a
motion by defendant for summary judgment was denied.
210. 124 N.Y.L.J. 569, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 1950).
211. 279 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd me n., 304 N.Y.
942, 110 N.E.?d 884 (1953).
212. 279 App. Div. at 422, 110 N.Y.S2d at 387.
213. Industrial Export & Import Corp. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 302
N.Y. 342, 98 N.E.2d 466 (1951). While the case concerned China, which is a Fund mem-
ber, it made no reference to the Agreement and is therefore considered apposite.
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great importance was attached to the place of performance, place of making,
and situs of the property originally involved; but little or no weight was
given to nationality, domicile (except as to matters of inheritance), or the
currency involved. If this inquiry showed the restriction to be the governing
law, it might nonetheless be refused application on public policy grounds if
the contact with the forum was relatively strong (as where domestic contract
rights or a domestic creditor or beneficiary was involved) or if the conflict
with the interest of the forum was relatively great (as where the interests
of a hostile government would be furthered or confiscation permitted).
The drafters of the Agreement, while establishing as the ultimate goal the
removal of restrictions on current transactions, nonetheless recognized the
necessity for controls on capital movements and, in some situations, on current
transactions. They recognized also that such controls would come to nought
if left prey to the judicial clich6s which competitive national interests had
developed. Accordingly, they agreed on the first sentence of Article VIII,
Section 2(b), as the proper principle to be applied among members who had
accepted international financial cooperation by subjecting themselves to the
limitations of the Agreement and the supervision of the Fund. The Agree-
ment thus not only determined policy concerning capital controls, but also
transplanted from the courts to an international body of monetary specialists
the determination of policy concerning restrictions on current transactions.
In so doing, the Agreement supplanted the conflict of laws rules which
previously formed the initial basis of decision. Under the Agreement and
regardless of relative strength of contacts, a United States agency or tri-
bunal will give effect to the law of the currency and refuse enforcement of a
deliberate consensual arrangement involving the exchange resources (cur-
rency, property, or services) of a country which is a Fund member at the
time the case is decided, if the arrangement then contravenes a restriction
which that member has maintained or imposed (whether before or after the
arrangement was entered into) consistently with the Agreement. In such
a case, it is not necessary that the proceeding be between the parties to the
arrangement. It is of importance, however, to consider other international
agreements between the United States and such member country, because an-
other agreement, whether earlier or later in time, may be of overriding force.
That the Agreement sanctions discriminatory controls during the tran-
sitional period, may require retroactive application of a regulation, and may,
as in the Perutz case, result in the enforcement of controls maintained by a
hostile government, does not lessen its binding effect in cases to which it
applies. Nor may these facts be advanced as valid policy objections to the
Agreement. The first two facts are concessions to the governmental interests in-
volved. The third objection may be answered by pointing to the sanctions
provided by the Agreement with which the Fund authorities may control
members whose regulations are being used for hostile, rather than valid, eco-
nomic purposes. In terms of policy, the degree of uniformity achieved through
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the Agreement in this otherwise chaotic field is to be counted a major bless-
ing.
In the same period of post-war international economic and financial co-
operation that produced the Fund Agreement, other international agreements
recognized the necessity for exchange controls in particular situations or
sought to extend the area of operation of the Agreement. This led to the con-
tention that "exchange control, formerly a bastard of the law, had become
legitimate, ' 2 14 and that public policy no longer prevented but, on the con-
trary, required the application of foreign exchange regulations even to situa-
tions not covered by the terms of any specific international agreement. Tran-
sition from the cordial post-war period to the increasing political tensions of
the "cold war" has proven those statements to be exaggerated. While it is
true that an exchange control may no longer be considered per se contrary
to public policy, the change in attitude, to continue the above-quoted meta-
phor, must be likened to the statutes which permit an illegitimate to inherit
from his mother but not from his father! Thus American courts, in cases not
involving an international compact, tend to use the public policy device to
deny application of controls, unless the situation is one in which a positive
interest of the United States otherwise indicates. Whether the interest of the
United States requires the application or rejection of a particular restriction
is a matter which the courts will hold concluded by a deliberate determina-
tion, formally expressed, of the political departments of the Federal Govern-
ment. To the extent that the policy determination is thus shifted from the
courts to political and economic specialists, one may expect a more widespread
recognition of controls maintained for purposes which are truly economic.
This does not, however, presage an increased willingness to recognize the
controls of Soviet-Bloc non-member countries; nor does it mean the replace-
ment of private international law norms by the law of the currency, as in the
case of the Agreement. It is not to be expected that the courts will readily
accept the view that public policy now requires the application of controls
which, under conflicts criteria, would not otherwise be applicable.- *c
There thus remains a broad area in the field of exchange control law which
must be clarified by further international regulation before we can have a
common standard guaranteeing uniform decisions in the field.21 But with
or without clarification, the Peritz case and Article VIII, Section 2(b),
strongly suggest that the bar and the business community must scrutinize
214. Friedmann, Foreign Exchange Control in A4mcrican Courls, 26 ST. Joni.-s L
REv. 97, 108 (1951). See Domke, Protcction of American Properly Abroad, 4 Tun
REcoRD 268, 271 (1949).
215. Mann, Money in Public Intenzational Law, 26 Brir. Y.B. Itz~f L 259, 278
(1949). See also Do=E, CONTROL OF AUEN PRoPRTY 205 (1947).
216. The need for further regulation is suggested by Mann in an unpublished p2per
on "International Monetary Law," presented by him to the 1952 Lucerne Conference of
the International Law Association.
19531
910 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 62:867
foreign controls more carefully-at least until the establishment of govern-
ment insurance against non-payment caused by exchange controls.2 17 Now,
even more than before, the careful negotiator will demand payment before
delivery or through an irrevocable letter of credit in his own currency, or,
failing that, the guaranty of a resident of his own or some third country.
217. Such insurance has been proposed in a bill introduced by Senator Murray of
Montana. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1953, § 3, p. 5, col. 4.
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